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A Case for the Public Domain
CLARK D. ASAY*
Over the past several decades open license movements have proved highly
successful in the software and content worlds. Such movements rely in part on
the belief that greater freedom of use triggers innovative activity that is
superiorto what a restrictive IP approachyields. Ironically, such open license
movements rely on IP rights to promote their visions offreedom and openness.
They do so through IP licenses that, while granting significantfreedoms, also
impose certain conditions on users such as the "copyleft" requirement in the
software world. Such movements rely on this IP-based approach due to fears
that, without IP rights and such conditions, a tragedy of the commons would
ensue. This Article argues that this IP-basedapproach, while perhaps helpful
in the beginning, is no longer necessary in many cases and in fact prevents the
movements from reaching theirfull potential. The IP-based approach has this
effect by causing significanttransactioncosts, often without offsetting benefits,
resulting in a tragedy of the anti-commons. The IP-based approach also
creates the risk of IP trolls in the future, especially in the copyright sphere.
Furthermore, the resulting anti-commons is unnecessary to prevent the feared
tragedy of the commons because most contributorsto open license movements
do so for reasons that do not fit within the typical tragedy of the commons
story. The Article then examines the benefits of a public domain approachand
argues that such an approach would reduce the wasteful transaction costs,
limit the possibility of IP trolls, still satisfy the purposes of many that
contribute materials under open licenses, and better align with the normative
tenets of such movements. To conclude, the Article assesses the merits of a
"PublicDomain Act" that would help address obstacles that currently exist in
dedicating materials to the public domain and posits some theoretical
implications relating to innovation and creativity based on the experiences of
the open license movements and the arguments of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to conventional wisdom, societies will under-produce inventions
and other creative works without intellectual property (IP) rights.' IP regimes
throughout the world reflect this belief, 2 including the United States
Constitution. 3 Over the last number of years, furthermore, countries across the
globe have bolstered IP rights in response to technological changes. 4 Doing so,
I ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011) (indicating that
current convention postulates that IP law seeks to maximize the net social benefit by offering
above-market rewards (i.e., IP rights) to creators of inventions and other works that would
not be created, or not be created as soon or as well, without such IP rights).
2Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm,31 CARDOzO L. REv. 1437, 1441
(2010).

3 ROBERT

P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY INTHE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (6th ed. 2012) (Article I, Section 8 of the

U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.").
4 Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 1441.
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the argument goes, is necessary to ensure that societies continue to receive the
benefits of inventive and creative activity.
In the past few decades, several "open" license movements have arisen in
response to the increasingly expansive IP regimes throughout the world.5 These
movements are based in part on an alternative theory of innovation, namely,
that freedom of use fosters increased collaboration, which in turn spurs
inventive and creative activity. 6 Some have thus identified open license
movements as anti-IP movements, at least in the traditional utilitarian sense of
IP. 7 Ironically, however, these open license movements rely on IP rights to
promote their paths of innovation and creativity. They do so through IP licenses
that essentially give users the freedom to do what they'd like with the licensed
materials, subject to certain attribution requirements and in some cases granting
the same expansive freedoms to any additional downstream users of the
materials-the so-called "copyleft," "viral," "reciprocal," or "share-alike" effect
of such licenses.8
These open license movements have experienced significant success in
promoting inventive and creative activity, despite the utilitarian/economic
incentives story that suggests such activity is unlikely. 9 Popular consumer
electronic products, such as Android-based phones and tablets, run largely on
free and open source software (FOSS).1 0 The world's web servers largely do as

5 See Chris DiBona et al., Introduction, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN

SOURCE REVOLUTION (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999) (providing a comprehensive history of
the beginnings of the free and open source software movement). See generally History,
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited Oct. 14, 2013)
(listing chronologically milestones that the Creative Commons has reached since its
inception in 2001).
6
See, e.g., RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED
ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 40-41, 45-56 (2d ed. 2010) (arguing that software
"freedom" enables developers to share their improvements with each other more readily,
which in turn leads to enhanced innovation); see also About, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (indicating that its goal is to
develop legal and technical infrastructure that "maximizes digital creativity, sharing, and
innovation").
7
See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
183, 184 (2004) (viewing open licensing movements as introducing new dynamics to the
public domain, and thus the world of non-IP); see also Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1105, 1127 (2005) (indicating that open license movements "bypass[] the structural
inequalities of the intellectual property system" and reject "the philosophical basis of
copyright and patent" laws).
8
See infra Part II.
9 See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
17-21 (2008) (discussing the significant successes of FOSS). See generally STEVEN WEBER,
THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 1-18 (2004).
10
See generally ANDROID OPEN SOURCE PROJECT, http://source.android.com/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013).
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well.I' Popular web browsers such as Firefox, Chrome, and Safari are also built
on FOSS. 12 Wikipedia content is available under a Creative Commons
license.1 3 Millions of copyright holders have released content under Creative
Commons licenses.1 4 And the list goes on. 15
Given these counterintuitive results, commentators have devoted significant
attention to analyzing why these movements have experienced such successes.
Many commentators have focused on the reasons why people and firms
contribute to open-licensed projects, despite lacking the typical economic
incentives to do so.1 6 Others have explored the virtues of open license
movements themselves in order to explain their successes. 17 And yet others
have championed expanding the tenets of open license movements into other
areas in order to generate the same types of benefits that more mature open
license movements have yielded.' 8
Yet little if any attention has focused on analyzing whether the original
strategy of the most successful open license movements-that is, relying on IP
rights to counter restrictive IP regimes and thereby promote innovation and
creativity-is actually the right strategy. Some have argued against certain
aspects of this IP approach, but no one has made a serious case for abandoning
IP rights altogether.19 Most seem to take the IP approach as a given, while
1IJacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting the many successes
of open licensing movements).
12 Id
13 Id

141d (noting that by Creative Commons' estimates some one million works have been
licensed under Creative Commons licenses).

15
See, e.g., Gavin Newsom, Why Open Source Is the New Software Policy in San
Francisco, MASHABLE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/01/22/open-source-san-

francisco/ (discussing the city of San Francisco's adoption of FOSS to serve critical IT
needs).
I6 See infra Part II.
17See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the

Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375-77 (2002) (articulating certain advantages of open, peer-topeer production over traditional firm management of innovation, such as more efficient
allocation of human capital to address innovation problems).
18
See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REv. 571, 582-83, 611 (2011)
(arguing that an open model of innovation in the field of personal robotics is necessary in
order for the field to reach its potential). See generally John R. Ackermann, Toward Open
Source Hardware, 34 U. DAYTON L. REv. 183, 183-85 (2009) (discussing efforts to apply
open license principles to hardware development generally).
19
There has been significant discussion about what types of open licenses serve the
interests of the movements most ably. See, e.g., Why Copyleft?, GNU OPERATING SYs.,

http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-copyleft.html (last updated June 10, 2012) (arguing in
favor of reciprocal licenses over attribution-only licenses in the FOSS world); Eric S.
Raymond, The Economic Case Against the GPL, ARMED AND DANGEROUS (Apr. 26, 2009),

http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=928 (critiquing the need for reciprocity, but falling short of
critiquing the overall IP approach); Greg R. Vetter, "Infectious" Open Source Software:
Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53, 59, 161-62 (2004)

(arguing that reciprocal licenses do more harm than good); Miriam Bitton, Modernizing
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others have advocated bolstering it. 20 Many, including the founders of such
movements, have argued that IP rights are necessary in order to prevent a
tragedy of the commons. 2 1 If open-licensed materials were left unprotected by
IP rights, the argument goes, free riders would simply take from the commons
while not contributing back into it.2 2 The commons would disappear. Others
have come to similar conclusions. 23
This Article makes a case for a public domain approach to innovation and
creativity. Despite the successes of the lIP approach in open license movements,
this Article argues that the FOSS, Creative Commons, and other open license
movements would in many cases be better served by abandoning IP rights
altogether and fully embracing a public domain approach.
Several arguments, as laid out more fully below, support this conclusion.
First, in the corporate setting, the presence of IP rights introduces wasteful
transaction costs, without offsetting benefits, and these costs slow innovation
and creativity, which is antithetical to some of the primary objectives of open
license movements. A "tragedy of the anti-commons" results. Second, and
importantly, dedicating such materials to the public domain in most cases still
satisfies the complex set of motivations of actors that choose to contribute to
open-licensed projects, at least to the same extent that the IP approach does. In
short, IP rights do not appear to be a primary motivation of contributors to
open-licensed projects. This is yet another reason to doubt that abandoning the
IP approach will lead to less innovation or creativity in open license
movements, or that a tragedy of the commons would occur without IP rights.
Third, the rationales for the IP approach no longer appear persuasive in
light of actual experience. The successes of attribution-only licensed projects
and the rise of Cloud computing-where the reciprocal effect of open licenses
Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 102-10 (2011) (advocating reforming
copyright law to reflect many of the tenets of open license movements, including attribution
and reciprocity). But few have advocated or even explored abandoning IP rights altogether
and fully embracing a public domain approach. For one such movement, see Unlicense
Yourself Set Your Code Free, UNLICENSE.ORG, http://unlicense.org/ (last visited Oct. 13,

2013) (advocating a public domain approach to software, at least with respect to copyright).

20 Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive
Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical

Disarmament,26 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37-45 (2012) (proposing a model defensive patent
license in order to protect open license movements from the threat of patents); Lydia Pallas
Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative
Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 271,

322-27 (2007) (advocating the adoption of a doctrine of limited abandonment of copyright
in order to ensure that users of open-licensed materials continue to retain the public benefits
of such materials in perpetuity).
21 See infra Parts III.C and IV.E.

22
23

See infra Parts III.C and IV.E.

See, e.g., David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U.

ILL. L. REv. 241, 287-88 (arguing that without IP rights, the FOSS movement would likely
founder due to free rider issues and contributors to the FOSS movement lacking assurance
that their contributions would not be "taken advantage of' by such free riders).
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is generally not in play-provide just two, yet powerful, examples. Fourth,
dedicating materials to the public domain would help eliminate the possibility
of IP trolls 24 using open-licensed materials against "infringers" in the future.
Such a possibility seems especially perverse given the purposes of open license
movements in the first place-that is, promoting as broad use of the materials as
possible. And finally, clinging to an IP approach reinforces the legitimacy of
expansive IP rights in the software and content arenas, a primary concern of
such movements. Conversely, promoting freedom of use through public domain
dedications better helps create a true commons and norms of free access and
use.
This is not to say that IP rights were not vital in helping establish the open
license movements. To the contrary, IP rights played a significant role,
especially in the early years of such movements, in helping users see the
advantages and potential of open innovation. But in the majority of cases today
the IP approach's time has come and gone. As this Article will argue, open
license movements continue to thrive in spite of IP rights, not because of them.
That these movements would do even better in many cases without IP rights
suggests that open innovation can and should become viable on its own. But the
crutch of IP rights has prevented these movements from reaching their full
potential. In most cases, therefore, this crutch should be abandoned.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an open licensing primer,
including an overview of the general categories of open licenses and the
literature regarding why people and firms contribute to open-licensed projects.
Part III then examines the costs the IP approach has in the corporate setting
which, this Article argues, no longer serve any purpose other than stifling
innovation and creativity, resulting in a tragedy of the anti-commons. Part IV
explores the merits of a public domain approach and contends that such an
approach would eliminate many of these wasteful transaction costs, satisfy the
motivations of most contributors to open-licensed projects, reduce the
possibility of IP trolls, and better align-both in theory and in practice-with
the goals of open license movements, all without resulting in a tragedy of the
commons. Part V explores challenges that a public domain approach might
present, as well as possible solutions to such challenges in the form of a federal
Public Domain Act. Part VI concludes by positing some theoretical implications
relating to innovation and creativity based on the experiences of the open
license movements and the arguments of this Article.

24

Generally, IP trolls are considered IP rights owners who do not themselves develop
products or engage in creative activity, but instead focus on asserting their IP rights against
others who do in order to extract licensing fees. For a discussion of the different types of
patent trolls and the different tactics that they use, see Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas
Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1-2, 11-12, 35-61
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2269
087.
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II. OPEN LICENSING
A. Open Licensing 101
The Creative Commons and FOSS movements constitute the two largest
and most successful open license movements in the world. The Creative
Commons licenses are generally intended for content such as literary works,
music, and other creative materials subject to copyright. 25 The FOSS licenses
are primarily intended for software. 26 Both licensing movements rely on IP
rights to promote their causes. 27 Rather than disclaiming IP rights, licensors of
open-licensed materials retain them while granting downstream users
significant rights in the source code 28 in the case of FOSS licenses and the
content in the case of Creative Commons licenses. 2 9
What do the licensors require in return? In both movements, two general
categories of licenses exist. 30 The first are what might be called "attributiononly" licenses. These licenses essentially grant downstream users a license to all
of the creator's rights in copyright-and sometimes patent rights in the FOSS
world-subject to downstream users including relevant IP notices and a copy of
the applicable open license in the documentation of any additional distribution
to third parties. 3 1

25
26

See CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 6.
See generally About, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.fsf.org/about/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2013); About the Open Source Initiative, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://open
source.org/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
27
See CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 6 (Creative Commons licenses "are not an
alternative to copyright. They work alongside copyright and enable you to modify your
copyright terms to best suit your needs."); STALLMAN, supra note 6, at 129 (stating that
"since proprietary software developers use copyright to stop us from sharing, we cooperators
can use copyright to give other cooperators an advantage of their own: they can use our
code" via FOSS licenses such as the General Public License).
28 That is, the human-readable version of the software that is ultimately translated into
object or binary code, which the relevant device then executes.
29 The Creative Commons movement does include a public domain dedication tool that
users are free to adopt, which will be discussed in more detail infra Part V.
30 The Creative Commons movement includes other license variations based on
prohibitions against commercial use and making derivative works, which conditions can be
mixed and matched with the attribution and share-alike requirements in order to create the
preferred set of license requirements. The most widely used FOSS licenses do not include
any such limitations, and so this Article will not focus on these license variations, although
the basic conclusion of this Article-that a better approach to open innovation would be to
abandon IP rights altogether-applies equally to these license variations.
31 For examples of such a license in each movement, see The BSD 2-Clause License,
OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/licenses/BSD-2-Clause (last visited Sept. 6,
2013) (providing the general template of the BSD 2-Clause FOSS license, one of the more
popular and widely used attribution-only licenses in the FOSS movement); Attribution 3.0
Unported, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode (last
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The attribution-only licenses are generally the most permissive type of open
licenses. 32 In many respects they are quasi-public domain dedications since
subsequent users have no obligations other than providing the required
attribution. Indeed, any third party is entitled to sell the open-licensed materials
under its own brand and license terms, so long as providing the relevant
attribution. 33 Doing so in most cases is unrealistic, since potential purchasers
can also obtain the software or content themselves under the terms of the
attribution-only license directly from the original licensor, so long as the
original licensor continues to license the material accordingly. But if sellers of
the attribution-only software or content modify the software or content, they
need not offer that modified version under the terms of the original attributiononly license. 34 They can "close" that modified version and charge for it.35 In
essence, they are free to take from the commons, but they need not contribute
back into them.
The second general category of open licenses dictates the opposite result.
These licenses are generally referred to as "viral," "reciprocal," or "copyleft"
licenses in the FOSS context, and "share-alike" licenses in the Creative
Commons world. For ease of reference, this Article will use one term going
forward: "reciprocal" or "reciprocity." Reciprocity requires downstream users,
upon modifying the content or software and further distributing it, to make that
modified version available to downstream users under the terms of the original
open license. 36 Any unmodified version that the downstream user distributes
must also remain under the original open license terms.
One of the basic purposes of reciprocal licenses, therefore, is to prevent
downstream users from taking from the commons while not contributing back
into them. In the words of Eben Moglen, a leading figure in the FOSS
movement, reciprocity serves to prevent "defections" from the FOSS
visited Sept. 6, 2013) (providing the general template of the Creative Commons Attribution
3.0 Unported
license).
32
See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/

(last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (indicating the attribution-only license as its "most
accommodating of licenses offered").
33

See Frequently Asked Questions: Can Open Source Software Be Used for
Commercial Purposes?, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/faq#commercial

(last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (indicating that FOSS can be used for commercial purposes,
while cautioning that reciprocal licenses might prevent subsequent users from imposing
additional restrictions on the FOSS, which attribution-only licenses do not do).
34

Terry Hancock, Copyleft Has No Impact on Project Activity?!, FREE SOFTWARE

MAG. (Sept. 10, 2008, 4:33 PM), http://www.freesoftwaremagazine.com/articles/copyleft
hasnoimpactproject activity (indicating that one reason developers choose reciprocal
licenses over attribution-only licenses is to avoid their work being "hijacked" or co-opted).
3

5 Id.
See, e.g., What Is Copyleft?, GNU OPERATING Sys., http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/

36

(last updated Oct. 6, 2012) (providing a general overview of how copyleft works);
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/

licenses/by-sa/3.0/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (providing a definition of "share-alike").
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movement. 37 The FOSS and Creative Commons movements thus use reciprocal
IP licenses to lock software and content into their versions of openness and
freedom.
Reciprocal licenses in the FOSS world also often explicitly-and, in other
cases, some have argued, implicitly 3 8-grant downstream users a patent license
while also requiring anyone that contributes to and further distributes the
software to similarly grant patent licenses to downstream users.3 9 Attributiononly licenses also often include patent license terms, though the scope of such
patent terms is typically narrower than that found in reciprocal FOSS licenses. 40
The patent licenses in FOSS reciprocal licenses vary in scope and form, but
the general patent license concept appears in a number of important reciprocal
FOSS licenses. 4 1 Such patent reciprocity precludes patent suits from users and
distributors of FOSS, thus keeping the FOSS commons open and free to use, at
least with respect to those that benefit from it.4 2 For instance, such patent
reciprocity would preclude a corporate entity from taking FOSS, modifying it,
distributing it, and then asserting patent rights with respect to its modifications
to the FOSS against any downstream users of the materials. 4 3
Directly monetizing reciprocal-licensed materials is difficult. In many
reciprocal licenses there is nothing explicitly forbidding use of the materials for
commercial purposes. In fact, some founders of the open license movements
suggest commercial use is encouraged. 44 However, because the reciprocal

37

Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant:Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 4

FIRST38MONDAY (1999), http://pear.accc.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fin/article/view/684/594.

See, e.g., Florian Mueller, GPLv2's Implicit Patent License and Dalvik, LWN.NET

(June 6, 2011, 9:38 PM), http://lwn.net/Articles/446323/ (noted FOSS activist confirming
the industry understanding that the second version of the General Public License includes an
implicit patent license).
39

See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, The General Public License Version 3.0: Making or
Breaking the FOSS Movement?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 265, 288-91 (2008)

(summarizing the patent provisions of the newest version of the General Public License).
40
See, e.g., Apache License, Version 2.0, APACHE SOFTWARE FOUND., § 3 (Jan. 2004),
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
41 Some reciprocal licenses have additional requirements. For instance, in 2007 the Free
Software Foundation released version three of the General Public License (GPL3), one of
the FOSS world's most popular licenses. In addition to its controversial patent provisions,
GPL3 imposes significant requirements on users of GPL3-licensed software with respect to
digital rights management technology used in connection with such GPL3-licensed software.
The Creative Commons movement includes a slate of six different license options, some of
which prohibit commercial use of the Creative Commons-licensed content, while another
option simply prohibits modifications. Though providing such options, Creative Commons
designates these as not "Free Culture Licenses."
42
Asay, supra note 39, at 289.
43
Id. at 288-89.
44See Moglen, supra note 37 (indicating that FOSS enables competitors of proprietary
software companies to more ably compete, and in response to suggestions that FOSS is anticommercial, "[n]othing could be further from the truth"); STALLMAN, supra note 6, at 4
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licenses dictate that the materials and any modified versions thereof remain
under the original open license terms, charging royalties for such materials
becomes impossible because anyone that receives a copy receives it under the
terms of the original reciprocal license terms and is thus free to distribute
additional copies to any other third party. 45 Consequently, attempts to charge
royalties will likely fail because once a copy is distributed under the reciprocal
license, costless copies will almost certainly become available.

B. Explainingthe Open LicensingParadox
Why do individuals, firms, and others contribute software and other creative
works under open licenses? Prevailing legal theory suggests that without direct
economic interests, such creators will not have the right set of incentives to do
so. 46 Consequently, no significant creative or innovative activity will occur.
And in the case of the FOSS and Creative Commons movements, finding direct
economic motivations for the owners of such materials is often difficult since
downstream users have such expansive rights in the open-licensed materials.
Commentators have provided a number of explanations for this apparent
paradox. Studies suggest that parties that contribute to FOSS projects do so
based on a complex mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motives. For instance,
contributors may participate in FOSS projects due to the "signaling effects" of
their development activity: though not gaining direct economic remuneration,
they may profit from reputational benefits and gain useful experience that
improves their future career opportunities. 4 7 Other surveys suggest that some
(indicating that FOSS does not mean "noncommercial" and that commercial FOSS is "very
important").
45

See, e.g., Free Software Found., GNU General Public License, Version 3, GNU
OPERATING SYS. (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0-standalone.html
(stipulating that "if you distribute copies of. . . a program [licensed under the General Public
License], whether gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same freedoms
that you received .. . [ensuring] that they, too, receive or can get the source code").
46
47

MERGES, supra note 1, at 2.
See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS.

EcoN. 197, 214 (2002) (discussing the "signaling incentives" that motivate software
programmers to participate in FOSS projects); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economics of
Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond, J. EcoN. PERSP., Summer 2005, at 99, 104

(postulating many of the same signaling incentives that motivate software programmers
while also reviewing extant surveys that confirm that such incentives do in fact motivate
programmers to contribute time and resources to open-licensed projects); Sebastian Von
Engelhardt, What Economists Know About Open Source Software-Its Basic Principlesand
Research Results 10-12 (Univ. Jena Econ. Dep't, Jena Research, Paper No. 2011-005,
2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1759976 (providing
a literature review of relevant studies done on the motivations of programmers in
contributing to open-licensed projects). In addition to these surveys and studies specifically
addressing the FOSS context, recent academic work has also analyzed the non-pecuniary
reasons that people and firms innovate more broadly. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive
Incentives in IntellectualProperty,98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1771-81 (2012).
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contributors participate simply because they enjoy the sense of creativity that
comes with their participation and sharing knowledge with others. 4 8 Eben
Moglen suggests that creativity by and large explains why individual
contributors participate in FOSS development. 49
The Free Software Foundation and its constituents, copyright holders of a
number of important FOSS projects, are primarily motivated by idealism and a
strong sense of what is "right" in the software world-that is, that software
wants and deserves to be "free." 50 Though tolerating attribution-only licenses in
limited cases, the Free Software Foundation licenses most of its projects under
reciprocal licenses and claims doing so has successfully pushed software into
the FOSS commons that otherwise would have remained "closed."5 1 Similar
rationales have influenced other IP rights holders to adopt reciprocal licenses
for their content and software. 52
Firms may contribute to open-licensed projects in order to promote an
alternative to their rivals' products. 53 This rationale helps explain why so many
corporate actors participated in the FOSS movement early on: in order to
promote an alternative-Linux-to Microsoft's dominant operating system. 54 It
also explains in part Google's sponsorship of the Android OS as an alternative
to Apple's iOS.55 Relatedly, firms often contribute to open-licensed projects
because they use and significantly benefit from the low-cost projects and
therefore seek to improve and influence them. 56 If the project adopts their
contributions, for instance, this can mean less engineering efforts required later
on to implement those same changes with each new version of the open48

See Engelhardt,supra note 47, at 11.
Moglen, supra note 37.
50
49

STALLMAN, supranote 6, at 40-41.

51 Id. at 129-31 (listing specific examples of where the reciprocity requirement
allegedly forced companies to contribute to the FOSS commons).
52

See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON.

& ORG. 20, 24-26 (2005) (indicating that the possibility of third parties "hijacking" nonreciprocal-licensed FOSS projects leads some projects to adopt reciprocal licenses). For
examples of IP rights holders adopting or advocating reciprocal licenses for their materials,
along with their rationales for doing so, see Dylan Harris, Why Copyleft, DYLAN HARRIS

(2003), http://dylanharris.org/prose/gal/ycl.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); Why Copyleft
Is Important for the Human Species as a Whole, LINUX REVIEWS, http://linuxreviews.org/

features/copyright vs copyleft/index.html.en (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (indicating that
reciprocity helps ensure that the commons remains open and robust).
53

See Merges, supra note 7, at 192-93; Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open
Source Software: Do PropertyRights Still Matter?, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH 1, 23 (2006).
54

55

Merges, supra note 7, at 193.
See, e.g., Jack Wallen, 10 Things Android Phones Do Better than the iPhone,

TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 3, 2009, 12:05 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/l0things/10things-android-phones-do-better-than-the-iphone/l 131 (indicating that one of the advantages
of Android compared to Apple's iOS is that the Android operating system is FOSS and
therefore available to all developers to improve and modify).
56
See Merges, supra note 7, at 193; Mann, supra note 53, at 21-22.
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licensed project, as well as triggering innovation in a direction that benefits the
firm. 57
Some firms, such as Red Hat, have also found ways to monetize openlicensed materials by selling services related to them. 58 Indeed, some firms do
not use FOSS as a profit center per se, but instead use it in connection with
complementary products such as hardware, premium versions of the software,
services such as maintenance, and so forth. 59
Conversely, IP rights do not appear to strongly motivate contributors to
open-licensed projects, at least in the traditional utilitarian/economic incentives
sense. 60 If they did, one might expect IP rights holders to enforce their rights
more diligently and collect damages when available. While some case law
surrounding open licenses exists, it is extremely limited, 6 1 despite some
evidence suggesting that open license compliance is often rather weak. 62 In
situations where rights holders have brought cases, they have typically done so
simply in order to enforce the open standards of the licenses, not in order to
obtain monetary damages. 63 For instance, in the FOSS world, the Free Software
Foundation's stated purpose is not to collect money damages, but to ensure that
FOSS remains "free." 64
This result seems unsurprising given that the motivations of most parties in
contributing to open-licensed projects are not directly economic in nature, i.e.,
57

See, e.g., Kevin McEntee, Why We Use and Contribute to Open Source Software,

NETFLIX TECH BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010), http://techblog.netflix.com/2010/12/why-we-use-andcontribute-to-open.html (indicating that one of the reasons that Netflix contributes to FOSS
projects is because "[b]y sharing our bug fixes and new features back out into the
community, the community then in turn continues to improve upon bug fixes and new
features that originated at Netflix and then we complete the cycle by bring[ing] those
improvements back into Netflix").
58
Mann, supra note 53, at 35.
59

Id. at 25.
60 Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of

Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 869-71 (2008) (noting that innovation in the
FOSS world does not "rely on the incentivizing effect of IP rights").
61 See generally Heather J. Meeker, Open Source and the Age of Enforcement, 4

HASTINGS Sci. & TECH. L.J. 267, 268-70 (2012) (providing a catalogue of FOSS-related
lawsuits).
62 Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software?, 78 U. CHI. L.

REv. 139, 151-52 (2011) (suggesting that, according to their survey results, users of FOSS
often fail to meet some of the basic obligations of FOSS licenses).
63
Meeker, supra note 61, at 286-87 (indicating that most FOSS-related suits up until
now have focused largely on "advocacy" for the FOSS cause, while noting that a new type
of litigant is emerging in the FOSS space that brings suits based on the same types of
rationales as traditional IP rights holders).
64

License

Violations and Compliance, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND.,

http://www.

fsf.org/licensing/compliance (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) ("Many copyright holders seek
monetary damages when their license is violated. We do not-we only want violators to
come back into compliance, and help repair any harm done to the free software community
by their past actions.").
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for most, the purpose is not to obtain financial rewards from the open-licensed
materials directly (either through royalties, license fees, or collecting damages
via litigation), even if a commercial enterprise is built around the open-licensed
materials (e.g., Red Hat). But as the remainder of this Article will demonstrate,
using IP rights as the means to the end of enhanced innovation and creativity in
open license movements has its limits and in fact often has significant negative
consequences. The IP approach often stymies innovation and creativity because
it introduces wasteful transaction costs. The resulting tragedy of the anticommons, furthermore, is unnecessary since the primary rationale for adopting
the IP approach-to avoid a tragedy of the commons-proves unpersuasive on
a number of levels. While the IP approach was perhaps necessary in the
beginning in order to help establish the movements, its continuing
predominance in many cases prevents open license movements from reaching
their full potential. The next sections examine the ways in which IP rights have
this effect.
III. OPEN LICENSING IN THE CORPORATE WORLD

A. From Enemies to Frenemies
Firms have been involved with the open license movements since their
beginnings. Early on, such involvement might be described as hesitant in the
best case scenario and hostile in the worst. Such initial hesitancy and hostility
were perhaps understandable. Since all open licenses disclaim any sort of
liability or warranty, firms naturally worried about using such open-licensed
materials without any sort of guarantee or backing from the licensor. 65
Furthermore, the language of open licenses is often opaque, leaving firms in
doubt about how they are permitted to use such materials. 66 Contributing
technology and content under open licenses-whether intentionally or
unintentionally via the effects of reciprocity-also seemed counterintuitive
since doing so essentially gave up firms' IP rights in any contributed materials,
at least in the traditionally restrictive sense. 6 7 Last and related, firms doubted
that such licensing models were sustainable; from their perspective, firms saw
little reason why anyone, let alone large numbers of people and firms, would

65Jon Christiansen et al., Redefining "Free": A Look at Open Source Software
Management, 8 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 425, 432 (2010) (comments of Mr. Joseph A.

Herndon); Lothar Determann & Gary Shapiro, Handling Open Source Software Risks in
Commercialand M&A Transactions,956 PL/PAT 227, 231 (2009).
66

See, e.g., HEATHER J. MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE: UNDERSTANDING

RISKS AND LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIEs 183-221 (2008) (discussing at length the varying
conflicting interpretations of the GPL, one of FOSS's most prominent licenses).
67Edmund J. Walsh & Andrew J. Tibbetts, Reassessing the Benefits andRisks of Open
Source Software, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9, 10-11 (2010).
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spend significant amounts of time and effort contributing to open-licensed
projects absent direct economic incentives to do so. 6 8
But while some of these concerns remain relevant today, firms have largely
embraced use of open-licensed materials. According to the research firm
Gartner, for instance, 85% of firms use FOSS in some form or another, with the
remaining holdouts planning to in the near future. 69 The vast majority of
contributions to important open-licensed projects now come from firms. 70 Even
Microsoft, long the perceived antithesis of the FOSS movement, has come to
embrace some forms of FOSS development. 7 ' Creative Commons also provides
a directory of hundreds of organizations that release millions of pieces of
content under various Creative Commons licenses. 72 Use of open-licensed
materials is pervasive and only promises to become more so. 73
What explains this change? Part of the explanation is simply that firms have
been proved wrong; open innovation is sustainable. Firms may have been
justified in doubting that armies of volunteers, as well as other firms, would
contribute vast amounts of time and resources into making technology and other
content freely available, but that is precisely what has happened-and continues
to happen. The previous section explored some of the reasons for this.
In addition to the sustainability of open innovation, its advantages have also
become more apparent. In the FOSS world, the Open Source Initiative was
founded in 1998 in part to more effectively sell the corporate world on the
advantages of FOSS development by abandoning the more confrontational
approach of the Free Software Foundation. 74 Eric Raymond's seminal work,
The Cathedraland the Bazaar, was also pivotal in more clearly articulating the
advantages of open and widely dispersed innovation in the FOSS world; his
68

See Robert L. Glass, The Sociology of Open Source: Of Cults and Cultures, IEEE

SOFTWARE, May-June 2000, at 104; David Lancashire, Code, Culture and Cash: The
Fading Altruism of Open Source Development, 6 FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 3, 2001),

journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fin/article/view/904/813
(critiquing the typical reasons
advanced for why open development occurs, and suggesting that market conditions largely
explain its occurrence, which in turn suggests that the open movements may not be
sustainable based on such typical reasons).
69

Gartner Says as Number of Business Processes Using Open-Source Software
Increases, Companies Must Adopt and Enforce an OSS Policy, GARTNER NEWSROOM (Nov.

17, 2008), http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=801412.
70 For instance, by some estimates, 75% of Linux code is written by developers paid to
do so. See, e.g., Angus Kidman, 75% of Linux Code Now Written by PaidDevelopers, APC

MAG. (Jan. 20, 2010, 1:07 PM), http://apcmag.com/linux-now-75-corporate.htm.
71 Elizabeth Montalbano, Microsoft Revising "Us vs. Them" Attitude Toward Open
Source via Powerset Acquisition, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 9, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.

computerworld.com/s/article/9123089/Microsoft revising usvs._themattitude-towardop
en source via Powerset acquisition?taxonomyld= 18&pageNumber-2 (discussing a change
in Microsoft's strategy vis-i-vis FOSS).
72 Content Directories,CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Content

Directories (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
3 See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
74
See Asay, supra note 39, at 270.
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most famous line from the work crisply made the case for an open development
process: "given enough eyeballs, all [software] bugs are shallow."75 His work
helped convince the Netscape Communications Corporation to release the
source code for the Netscape Communicator browser and start the Mozilla
project, a seminal event in the corporate world. 76 Since then, corporate use,
sponsorship of, and significant contributions to open-licensed projects have
exploded: Google's Android operating system, 77 Red Hat's Linux
distribution, 78 and Apple's significant contributions to the Webkit browser
project 79 are just a few of the more well-known examples.
Over time, firms have also simply become more familiar with open licenses
and using materials licensed under them. Although the meaning of various open
licenses remains murky in many cases, the widespread adoption of openlicensed materials and industry understandings of permitted uses have helped
firms grow more comfortable using such materials. 80
What role have IP rights played in these changing attitudes? Their primary
effect has been to ensure that firms and others take the conditions of open
licenses seriously. Thus, in some cases IP rights (and reciprocity in particular)
may have helped prevent firms from simply taking from the commons while not
contributing back into them. This seems especially true early on in the case of
Linux, where firms were so desperate for an alternative to Microsoft's dominant
operating system that even an unconventional licensing scheme such as the
General Public License was more palatable than the alternative of continuing to
cede ground to Microsoft. 8 '
But reciprocity in particular and the IP rights approach in general have
outlived their usefulness in many cases. Firms and users of open-licensed
materials have decades of experience in coming to appreciate the virtues of
open innovation. This does not mean that firms always elect to take advantage
75

ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, Release Early, Release Often, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE
BAZAAR 38, 41 (2000) [hereinafter BAZAAR], available at http://www.catb.org/-esr/

writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/ar0 1s04.html.
76

ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, Epilogue: Netscape Embraces the Bazaar, in BAZAAR,

supra note 75, at 75, 76, available at http://www.catb.org/-esr/writings/cathedralbazaar/cathedral-bazaar/arOlsl3.html (citing an e-mail from Eric Hahn, executive vicepresident and chief technology officer of Netscape at the time, which stated: "On behalf of
everyone at Netscape, I want to thank you for helping us get to this point in the first place.
Your thinking and writings were fundamental inspirations to our decision.").
77 See ANDROID OPEN SOURCE PROJECT, supra note 10.
78

See generallyRED HAT, http://www.redhat.com/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).

79See generally The WebKit Open Source Project, WEBKIT.ORG, http://www.webkit.

org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
80
See, e.g., Alan Stem & A. Clifford Allen, Open Source Licensing, 1109 PLI/PAT
645, 673-74 (2012) (discussing general industry understandings with respect to certain
aspects of reciprocity).
81 See DiBona et al., supra note 5, at 13-15 (outlining the dominant position that
Microsoft held in the server software space for years, which helped create the original
impetus for a FOSS alternative).
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of these virtues, but their merits in many contexts are largely uncontroversial.
At this stage IP rights more often than not simply introduce wasteful transaction
costs that inhibit innovation and creativity. 82 While it is often argued that such
costs are necessary in order to protect against a tragedy of the commons, there
are significant reasons to doubt this argument, as discussed more fully below.
The following sections first explore the significant costs that firms incur in
seeking to comply with open licenses and self-imposed requirements based on
the license requirements, followed by an analysis of why such costs are
unnecessary in most cases to sustain open innovation movements.

B. Transaction Costs
Despite the significant advantages of using and contributing to openlicensed projects, firms still face risks in doing so. And such risks are largely
the result of IP rights. For instance, firms face possible remedies under
copyright law-including injunctions and statutory damages-for failure to
comply with open licensing requirements such as reciprocity and attribution. 83
Furthermore, the reciprocal effect of certain open licenses has the potential to
subject a firm's proprietary materials to the terms of the open license. In such a
case, the firm has no means by which to prohibit third parties from further
licensing the materials under the same terms, even if the firm later licenses it
under different terms. Firms may also compromise significant patent rights
depending on the applicable open license and technology at issue.
As firms seek to address these risks, they incur significant transaction costs,
thereby slowing innovation and creativity. The resulting logjam might be
viewed as a form of a "tragedy of the anti-commons," in the parlance of
Michael Heller, 84 because such IP rights and the resulting transaction costs lead
to underuse of the relevant resources. 85
Superficially, the anti-commons in open license movements may appear
similar to others simply because the end result is similar. But the tragedy of the
anti-commons in open license movements is even more tragic because the result
is completely antithetical, generally, to the purposes of such movements and
their contributors. Indeed, unlike in other anti-commons contexts, where
82 Some have argued that open licenses actually reduce transaction costs by providing a
familiar licensing mechanism that both developers and users of open-licensed materials can
rely on. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 20, at 9. While it is likely true that over time
greater familiarity with the most popular open licenses has helped reduce transaction costs
that would result absent a better alternative, this Article argues that one such better
alternative that would reduce transaction costs even further is a straightforward public
domain approach.
83 Case law in the United States and elsewhere has confirmed that open licenses are
enforceable under copyright law. See generally Meeker, supra note 61, at 268-86.
84 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom

Marx to Markets, 111IIHARv. L. REv. 621, 673-79 (1998).
85 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
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numerous IP rights holders may withhold permission to use materials or hold
out until a royalty is paid (and thereby cause significant transaction costs that
inhibit use of the resource), 86 in open license movements the purpose is
generally to encourage as wide use as possible, absent royalties or any other
form of economic remuneration. As in other anti-commons contexts, the
transaction costs in open license movements result from the assignment of IP
rights to numerous owners. But, as this Article argues, they result in most cases
for no good reason.
These transaction costs can generally be grouped into the following
categories: (1) intake costs, (2) M&A costs, (3) internal management costs, and
(4) outbound costs. A discussion of each follows.

1. Intake Costs
In order to address the risks of using open-licensed materials, firms often
implement policies for reviewing and approving open-licensed materials before
they come into the firm.87 While obtaining a specific example of such a policy
is difficult given confidentiality and attorney-client privilege concerns, a
common approach includes requiring formal approvals at the legal, business,
security, and technical levels.88 Thus, in many firms each use of an openlicensed project requires vetting, regardless of what type of open license is
concerned, be it attribution-only or reciprocal.
The costs of doing so can be significant. 89 For instance, in the FOSS
context engineers may wait significant periods of time before obtaining relevant
approvals for a software solution that they simply want to test and may not even
ultimately adopt. 90 Such waiting periods are typically longer if the request
concerns a reciprocal license due to the thornier issues that come with such
licenses. 9 1 In some cases firm leaders may approve materials under a reciprocal
86

Id. at 698-99.
T. Robert Rehm, Jr., Navigating the Open Source Minefield: What's a Business To
Do?, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289, 314-17 (2010) (discussing generally the
87

types of considerations companies may take into account when implementing such policies).
88 See Karen F. Copenhaver, Open Source Policies and Processes for In-Bound
Software, in 1 ADVANCED LICENSING AGREEMENTS 2012, 785, 798-99 (Ira Jay Levy &

Joseph Yang eds.) (indicating that many organizations establish a cross-discipline team of
individuals that decides upon each use of FOSS at the organization).
89
See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 70-71 (indicating that the information gathering and
legal analysis components of compliance work are often costly and time-consuming,
especially the more complex an organization is).
90
See Copenhaver,supra note 88, at 800-01 (discussing the practical need at firms that
implement open license policies to guarantee some sort of response time to requests in order
to help ensure that the policy succeeds).
91 See Eli Greenbaum, Open Source Semiconductor Core Licensing, 25 HARV. J.L. &

TECH. 131, 139-40 (2011) (indicating that the scope and application of reciprocal licenses in
the FOSS world remain contentious topics, and commercial software developers therefore
remain wary of incorporating such materials into their proprietary products).
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license, but impose significant restrictions on their use in order to avoid the
effects of reciprocity. 92 Such processes and restrictions ultimately slow
innovation and creativity by introducing significant transaction costs.
Other intake costs result from firms' own internal rules about categories of
open licenses. For instance, some firms simply prohibit certain license types
because of the scope of the reciprocity requirement in such licenses.9 3 Apple,
for instance, prohibits developers in its App Store from using reciprocal
licensed software. 94 Such prohibitions can lead to a number of costs. For
example, due to the self-imposed unavailability of a solution licensed under a
banned license, the firm may end up using its own resources to develop the
solution itself or pay licensing fees to a third party for a commercially available
solution. 95 Furthermore, if materials under a prohibited license do make their
way in the door despite the policy, and the firm discovers them later, the firm
may undertake significant remedial action in order to remove and replace the
offending materials. 96
In order to help formulate, implement, and administer such intake policies,
some firms have even hired lawyers and technical personnel specifically
focusing on open license issues. 97 Firms also often seek aid from outside
counsel or vendors specializing in FOSS compliance such as Black Duck
Software, Palamida, or Open Logic. 98 All of these activities in the cumulative
lead to significant transaction costs that redirect resources from innovation and
creative activity to legal and internal firm compliance.
Another cost related to intake involves negotiating commercial license
agreements with third parties. Increasingly firms ask for representations and
warranties around open-licensed materials and an indemnity covering non92 Id. See generally Ron Phillips, Deadly Combinations:A Frameworkfor Analyzing
the GPL 's Viral Effect, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 487 (warning of the

dangers of reciprocal licenses). In my own experience advising hundreds of clients on the
use of open-licensed materials, whenever companies did approve use of reciprocally licensed
materials, the approval was always contingent on abiding by a variety of limitations on how
the materials could be used, primarily in order to avoid proprietary materials becoming
subject to the terms of the reciprocal license and thereby becoming "contaminated."
93 See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 75, 121 (indicating different licenses that firms often
ban and suggesting that a common approach to FOSS corporate policies is to include
different "black," "white," and "gray" lists with respect to what FOSS licenses are
permitted).
94Peter Ibbotson, Windows Phone 7 Developer Tools: A FirstLook, ZDNET (Sept. 27,

2010, 11:33 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/windows-phone-7-developer-tools-a-first-look3040090296/.
95 See Rehm, supra note 87, at 318 (indicating that firms may seek such commercial
solutions in the event that audits reveal software incompatible with the firm's open license
policy).
96

97

See id. at 318-21.

Copenhaver, supra note 88, at 799 (discussing the growing trend of hiring personnel
whose primary responsibility is to ensure open license compliance).
98
See, e.g., Stern & Allen, supra note 80, at 667 (discussing the availability of thirdparty vendors that perform such services).
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compliance with the relevant open licenses as part of the negotiation.9 9 In some
cases the firm may even ask for an audit of the third party's materials in order to
detect and review use of open-licensed materials in the products or services
being licensed or sold to it. 00 These costs are similar to those incurred in the
M&A context (discussed directly below), although generally on a smaller scale
depending on the size of the commercial deal.

2. M&A Costs
Firms also incur significant transaction costs related to open licenses in
connection with acquisitions.' 0 ' For instance, often a significant part of the due
diligence of a target company focuses on whether the target company uses
open-licensed materials and, if it does, whether the target company is in
compliance with the open licenses' requirements and whether the use of openlicensed materials has compromised in any way the target's key assets.102 Since
use of open-licensed materials is so pervasive, this issue becomes relevant in
most acquisitions, and becomes even more relevant when the target's products
and services focus on software or content products and services.1 03
The costs of this due diligence can be significant. The acquirer generally
requests a list of all open-licensed materials used at the firm, descriptions of
how they are used, and the applicable open license. 104 Generating these lists can
be such a significant burden on the target company that the parties will instead
hire an outside vendor to perform an audit to obtain the relevant information. 0 5
Some firms make such audits a prerequisite for any acquisition.106 Even once
the audit is done, firms will devote significant amounts of time to reviewing the

99 Diana Marina Cooper, Open Source Legal Concerns, 29 LAw. PC 6 (2012).

100 Copenhaver, supra note 88, at 803 (indicating that customers will often ask for lists
of open-licensed materials used in a product).
101
See generallyMEEKER, supra note 66, at 237-44.
02

1 See id.; see also Rehm, supra note 87, at 321 (identifying use of open-licensed
materials as a significant issue in M&A activity that firms should take into account when
developing their own open license policies); Determann & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 235-36
(specifying the types of information acquirers typically request with regards to open-licensed
materials).
103 MEEKER, supra note 66, at 237-39.
104Id. at 239.
105
For instance, Black Duck is one of the more popular solutions that firms use to
conduct such audits. BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE, THE NEW DUE DILIGENCE: ASSESSING AND
PROTECTING YOUR SOFTWARE ASSET VALUE IN MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND FINANCING
ROUNDS 1, available at advance.blackducksoftware.com/content/WPMADueDiligence.
106 See, e.g., DANIEL EGGER & MATTHEW HOGG, OS RISK MGMT., OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE IP RISK AUDITS: THE EMERGING DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD FOR TECHNOLOGY
M&A TRANSACTIONS 3, available at http://osriskmanagement.com/downloads/Open%20

Source%20Software%20P%2ORisk%20Audits.pdf (indicating that some companies
perform such audits with each transaction). It is also the personal experience of the author
that firms often mandate such scans with each transaction.
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results, implementing remedial actions, and negotiating over how the results
impact the terms of the merger agreement. 0 7

3. InternalManagement Costs
Once open-licensed materials find their way in the door, whether through
M&A activity or normal day-to-day intake, firms incur additional costs in
managing them on an ongoing basis. Firms often segregate open-licensed
materials from proprietary materials in their internal management systems in
order to help keep track of how the materials are being used and to prevent the
open-licensed materials from being intermingled with proprietary materials. 0 8
Doing so results in costs related to building the technical solutions for such
internal management as well as personnel time spent administering them. Firms
may also outsource developing these internal management solutions to third
parties.1 09 Even if a third-party solution is ultimately more efficient, it
nonetheless costs firms significant amounts of time, money, and effort to
implement.' 10

Other internal management costs result when firms discover errors in
information about open-licensed materials that the firm previously vetted and
approved. The costs of monitoring and then remediating these errors--either by
removing and replacing the open-licensed materials or updating them in order to
correct the errors-can also be significant for firms."' Firms also often spend
significant amounts of time training employees on their open license policies
and rely on outside experts to help perform such training.112

107

See Determann & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 235-41 (discussing generally factors
related to open licenses that firms take into account when negotiating agreements).
108 See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 53-70 (discussing the need generally for firms to
conduct due diligence and "compliance analysis" on their software code bases in order to
avoid mixing software subject to incompatible rights).
109 See, e.g., BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE, THE BusINEss CASE FOR AUTOMATING OPEN
SOURCE CODE MANAGEMENT 2, 8-9, available at advance.blackducksoftware.com/content/

WPAutomateOSSManagement (discussing the cost savings for firms in relying on a thirdparty solution such as Black Duck offers for managing FOSS use).
l0 See id at 8-9 (indicating, based on its model, an automated approach reduces FOSS
management costs significantly, but nonetheless still results in licensing and other
administrative costs).
I"'See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 71 (indicating that "[t]he larger the organization, and
the more backtracking there is to do, the more difficult the task" in remediating problems
discovered during compliance activities).
112

See,

e.g.,

Open

Source

Compliance

Courses,

LINUx

FOUND.,

https://training.linuxfoundation.org/courses/open-source-compliance (last visited Oct. 13,
2013) (providing a list of Linux-related training courses regarding compliance and best
practices).
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4. Outbound Costs
Firms also incur a variety of costs when open-licensed materials leave the
firm. These occur in a number of ways. First, when firms distribute openlicensed materials, they incur costs in ensuring that they comply with their own
internal policies and the open licenses themselves, since distribution is generally
the event that triggers the most significant open license compliance
obligations. 113 Firms will often conduct outbound audits of materials in order to
ensure internal and legal compliance.11 4 Because development activities are
often dynamic and fast-moving, such audits can be common even in cases
where firms generally conduct intake reviews and attempt to monitor the use of
the materials after intake. 15
Firms may develop their own auditing system, which results in its own
upfront costs even if later it helps reduce costs.11 6 Or, firms often rely on a
third-party solution, either a vendor that conducts the audit on behalf of the firm
or a third-party auditing system that firms license from such vendors.' 17 Using
these third-party solutions still results in significant costs, both in the form of
licensing fees to such third parties as well as implementing the solutions and
reviewing the results." 8
Even in the case of attribution-only licenses, these outbound review efforts
can be significant.1 9 For instance, in the FOSS world, each source code file
may include a separate copyright notice and license agreement that needs to be
separately cited, typically as part of a legal notices document that accompanies
the outbound product or service. 120 Consequently, engineers, lawyers, and
others will spend significant amounts of time going through the files, extracting
the relevant notices, and compiling them into a legal notices document.121
Depending on the size of the software distribution and the number of software
files, this exercise can be extremely burdensome.1 22 Even in cases where some

ll3See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 27, 83 (indicating that distribution is generally
conditioned upon meeting requirements such as reciprocity and notice). Some licenses, such
as the Affero General Public License, define "distribution" to include making a hosted
software solution available to third parties, but this is the exception more than the rule.
114
See id.
at 71.
1l5 Id. (indicating that some firms conduct such diligence on an ongoing basis, simply as

a matter of good housekeeping).
116Id at 72.
1l7Id at 72-73.

118 BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE, supra note 109.
119

MEEKER, supra note 66, at 83 (indicating that meeting notice requirements is time-

consuming, and that complying with the exact letter of all notice requirements can be
literally impossible).
120Id at 83-85.
Id. at 84-85.
122 d.

12 1
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amount of automation helps improve efficiency, because of the possibility of IP
remedies, automation is rarely if ever fully relied on. 123
Reciprocal licensed materials increase the costs of making outbound
distributions. If a firm intends to distribute software that includes materials
under a reciprocal license, for instance, the firm will often review how the
materials are integrated with other materials in order to ensure that no firm
technology, content, or in some cases patents have been compromised.1 24 These
additional reviews are common even if upon intake certain restrictions were
specified, given that how the materials are used may have changed since the
time of intake and the changes may not have been addressed as part of the
firm's internal management of the materials.1 25 These reviews may lead the
firm to take remedial actions in order to avoid reciprocity obligations.1 26 Such
remedial actions both slow development release cycles and often require
significant personnel resources in order to implement them.127
Furthermore, because reciprocal licenses require releasing or making
available the reciprocal-licensed materials under the terms of the license, firms
expend significant amounts of time and resources compiling and reviewing the
materials to be so released.128 For instance, in the FOSS world, the firm will
need to review and compile all source code files to be released, and doing so
typically requires significant engineering and legal resources.
Outbound releases of open-licensed materials also result in costs even once
the materials are distributed. For instance, if errors are discovered in the
attributions, then the firm may update the legal notices document to correct
those errors. 129 Or, if the firm discovers that it is not in compliance with a
reciprocity requirement or its own internal policies, then the firm may incur
123Id. at 71-73 (detailing that compliance efforts typically include an information
gathering phase and a separate legal analysis stage, with the latter having to be conducted by
lawyers once the information has been gathered).
124 See id. at 98 (discussing patent issues that arise when distributing FOSS licensed
under a reciprocal license); see also Christiansen et al., supra note 65, at 437 (discussing an
example of an after-the-fact review that ultimately identified licensing issues that needed
resolution); Jeffrey D. Osterman, Software Licensing and Open Source, in UNDERSTANDING
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 2012, 583, 605 (Susan Progoff, Marcelo Halpern, &

Joseph Yang eds.) (discussing such reviews).
125 The likelihood of these additional reviews also increases because the open-licensed
materials may not have ever been reviewed in the first place.
126 See Osterman, supra note 124, at 605 (discussing such remedial actions).
12 7 Id.
12 8

See Beth Z. Shaw, Recent Lawsuits Reflect Open Source Software Users' Copyright
Compliance Obligations, 25 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 1-3 (May 7, 2010), available at

http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/05-07-1 OShaw LegalBackgrou
nder.pdf (discussing the requirements of reciprocal licenses and the consequences of certain
companies recently failing to release the source code to GPL-licensed software that they
distributed with certain hardware products).
129 See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 83 (indicating that while failure to correct inaccurate
notices is rarely the source of litigation or disputes, these notices may increasingly be the
subject of informal enforcement).
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costs in remediating the non-compliance, either by removing the non-complying
material or coming into compliance with the reciprocity requirement by
releasing, for instance, the required source code in the FOSS context. 130
Another cost related to distribution involves negotiating commercial
agreements with third parties. Third-party recipients of a firm's licensed or sold
materials will often ask for representations and warranties around open-licensed
materials and an indemnity covering non-compliance with open license
requirements as part of the negotiation.13' In some cases the third party may
even ask for an audit of the firm's materials in order to detect and review use of
open-licensed materials in the products or services being licensed or sold to
it. 132
Firms also incur significant costs when contributing to open-licensed
projects. Why firms might choose to contribute to open-licensed projects was
explored above.133 But even when contributing to open-licensed projects is to
the firm's advantage, IP licenses make the contributions more complicated.
For instance, contributing materials to an open-licensed project may impact
companies' patent portfolios in the FOSS context, depending on the applicable
license.1 34 Some of the patent licenses are exceedingly broad, so much so that
some firms ban such licenses altogether,135 while other patent licenses suffer
from a lack of clarity, thereby leaving firms in doubt as to how their patent
portfolio may be impacted. Another concern is simply that firms may not want
to give away their technology or content in a manner that limits their rights to
reclaim such materials later on.
In order to address such issues, firms often implement policies aimed at
vetting contributions to open-licensed projects before they are made.136 Much
like intake policies, contribution policies can result in significant waiting
periods while technical, business, legal, and security personnel review and
approve the contributions.1 37 Such policies thus consume personnel time in
developing and administering them, as well as slowing the speed of innovation
while employees await approvals. And in some cases, where approvals are
denied, the policies simply prevent innovation rather than merely slow it.
130 Sometimes firms discover such instances of non-compliance themselves and
voluntarily correct them, while in other cases IP rights holders prompt them into compliance.
See generally Meeker, supra note 61 (providing an overview of open license-related
enforcement activities).
131 See Determann & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 230-3 1.
132 Copenhaver, supra note 88, at 803 (indicating that customers will often ask for lists
of open-licensed materials used in a product).
133 See supra Part I.B.
134 MEEKER, supra note 66, at 139-40.
135

See id. at 75; Ibbotson, supra note 94.

136 See generally MEEKER, supra note 66, at 135-51 (providing a general overview of

the types of factors firms take into account when releasing software as FOSS).
137Id. at 130-31 (outlining a template corporate open source policy based in best
practices and suggesting that firms should follow an established management approval
process that includes at least a review by the firm's lawyers).
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C. Worth Every Penny?
All of these efforts result in costs, which in turn slow innovation since firms
could otherwise direct their resources towards innovating. Some studies suggest
that the costs of open license compliance programs can be extremely high,
regardless of how firms conduct them.138 A version of the tragedy of the anticommons thereby plays out, despite the reality that most contributors to openlicensed projects contribute precisely in order to promote a robust and freely
accessible commons.
But is this anti-commons necessary in order to ensure a robust commons?
Supporters of the IP approach argue that these costs are vital to maintain the
open license movements. This is essentially the Free Software Foundation's
argument in favor of reciprocal licenses: reciprocity ensures that software and
content stay "free," and the costs of the IP approach, while not ideal, are simply
the price necessary for a tremendous amount of freely available technology.1 39
Without reciprocity, too many free riders--especially, perhaps, firms-would
result in a commons gutted of its innovative and creative capacity.140 A tragedy
of the commons would ensue, the argument goes.141 Similarly, though vetting
attribution-only licenses does entail some costs, these costs pale in comparison
to the value of the FOSS and content that contributors are willing to donate to
the commons in exchange for the attribution.142
Furthermore, why focus on the transaction costs of firms at all? The open
license movements were founded in order to benefit society generally, not
firms. They were also founded in part as a response to the increasingly
aggressive IP stances of firms. And firms remain aggressive with respect to IP
rights, and perhaps have grown even more so in the intervening years. Thus, the
original strategy of fighting restrictive IP rights with permissively licensed IP
rights may remain relevant.
But while open license movements may not have been founded to benefit
firms, it is clear that firms greatly benefit the movements. Firms are not only
consumers of open-licensed materials, but also significant contributors to openlicensed projects.143 In the FOSS world, for instance, firms often hire engineers
specifically in order to contribute to open-licensed projects that the firm
138 See BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE, supra note 109, at 1 (indicating that on average it costs

firms $7,800 per software component annually to effectively manage risks associated with
open licenses, while suggesting that use of its automated risk management tools can help cut
these costs significantly).
139 See, e.g., STALLMAN, supra note 6, at 129-31 (labeling reciprocity "pragmatic
idealism" and indicating that without it, the commons would not be as robust as it is).
140 See Moglen, supra note 37.
141 Id.
142

See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 85 (indicating that notice requirements may serve an
important role in providing contributors with attribution in exchange for making software
freely available).
143 See, e.g., Kidman, supra note 70.
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supports.144 Firms also lead some of the more successful FOSS projects in the
world, including Google's Android, Red Hat's Linux distribution, and many
others.145 Given these realities, it is worth examining whether the significant
transaction costs that IP rights introduce actually serve useful purposes, and
whether a public domain approach might maintain the movements or even
improve them by eliminating some of these transaction costs and thereby
allowing for accelerated innovation.

1. What Attribution?
In important respects, the IP approach to open innovation often fails to
fulfill the roles assigned to it. For instance, with respect to attribution-only
licenses, in most cases the attribution is buried somewhere in legal
documentation so that any recognition that may accompany such attribution is
minimal at best.14 6 This reality suggests that in most cases a different type of
recognition than what the UP approach provides likely motivates those that
contribute materials under attribution-only licenses. In the FOSS world, tools
such as GitHub, a widely used social software coding tool, might better provide
the recognition programmers seek.14 7 The fact that more and more software is
contributed via GitHub without UP notices or license information at all suggests
that the "prize" of an IP notice in obscure legal documentation is not much of
one, at least to those contributing.14 8
Furthermore, attribution need not be connected to IP rights and, therefore,
IP remedies. The latter is what largely drives the wasteful transaction costs that
ultimately slow innovation and creative activity, since the threat of IP remedies
144

See, e.g.,

Welcome to

HotLinuxJobs! Open Source Jobs, HoTLINUXJOBS

http://www.hotlinuxjobs.com/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2013) (search firm specializing in open
source software jobs and providing a list of current openings); Nic Williams, 8 Ways
Companies Can Contribute to Open Source Communities, MASHABLE (Mar. 30, 2011),

http://mashable.com/2011/03/30/business-open-source-communities/
(discussing
the
author's own company hiring specific personnel for contributing to a particular FOSS
project).
145
See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
146 See MEEKER, supra note 66, at 85 (suggesting that it is questionable whether

attribution requirements in general satisfy the desires of contributors for attribution, and
reviewing a particular FOSS license's attempt to provide more meaningful attribution).
147
See GiTHUB, https://github.com/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Klint Finley,
What

Exactly

Is

GitHub

Anyway?,

TECHCRUNCH

(July

14,

2012),

http://techcrunch.com/2012/07/14/what-exactly-is-github-anyway/ (providing an overview
of GitHub).
148See, e.g., Jon Buys, The Top Licenses on GitHub, OSTATIC (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://ostatic.com/blog/the-top-licenses-on-github (indicating that several of the most
popular projects on GitHub are provided without licensing information); GitHub Projects
Without Licenses, SOGGY BLOGGER (Dec. 26, 2009, 5:24 PM), http://www.soggy
blogger.com/blog/2009/12/github-projects-without-licenses.html
(summarizing
one
developer's frustration with the lack of licensing information found in many projects on
GitHub).
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causes firms to tread cautiously when dealing with open-licensed materials.14 9
But technological solutions to attribution could potentially provide the same
attribution-or perhaps even better provide it by automating the attribution or
making it an integral, irreplaceable part of the work-while also removing the
threat of IP remedies that reduce the speed of innovation and creativity by
introducing the transaction costs detailed above. Alternatives to the IP rightsbased approach to attribution are discussed more fully in Part IV below.

2. Reciprocity's Broken Promises
With respect to reciprocity, the argument that firms' hands are forced, and
that the content and software commons are larger due to reciprocity, in many
cases seems dubious. 50 As discussed above, firms spend significant amounts of
time and resources precisely in order to avoid results that they find inimical to
their interests, including in particular the obligations of reciprocity.151 Indeed,
some open licenses are so expansive in their reciprocity requirements that firms
simply ban materials licensed under them, whereby reciprocity may, ironically,
have the unintended consequence of shrinking the commons rather than
expanding them.152 Firms use and contribute to open-licensed projects when it
suits their purposes. Such purposes may have expanded over time as the
benefits of open innovation have proved sustainable and significant, but firms
do not appear captives of reciprocity in any sort of meaningful way.153

149 See Walsh & Tibbetts, supra note 67, at 10 (highlighting the growing legal risks to
companies in using openly innovated technologies based on an increase of IP enforcement
activities in the open innovation arena).
150For such a claim, see STALLMAN, supra note 6, at 129-31 (specifying several
software projects that, it is argued, were forced to join the FOSS world due to reciprocity).
151 See supra Part III.B. Another example of this phenomenon is Qualcomm, which
recently restructured itself largely in order to avoid the reciprocal effects of FOSS licenses
on its patent portfolio. See Chloe Albanesius, Qualcomm Restructures To Protect Patents,
PCMAG.COM (June 28, 2012, 1:52 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2406466,
00.asp.
152 Vetter, supra note 19, at 153.
153 Some posit the case of Linux as a counterexample to this claim. For instance,
Linux's reciprocal license requires firms that use Linux to make the source code to their
specific hardware drivers and other kernel changes available under reciprocal terms; without
reciprocity, they may have been less likely to do so. Several factors weaken this
counterexample, however, at least with respect to the claims of this Article. Firms that use
Linux elect to do so, and so can elect not to use Linux at any time that the reciprocity
requirement becomes overly burdensome to them. Presumably, then, firms have taken into
account the tradeoffs between giving up secrecy surrounding their source code innovations
in Linux and the right to use Linux at all. The fact that Linux continues to be popular and use
thereof continues to grow suggests perhaps more than anything that firms have come to more
fully appreciate that the value of secrecy in their source code is insignificant compared to the
benefits of open innovation. Thus, the Linux example actually seems to support the claims of
this Article, i.e., that reciprocity is not primarily responsible for safeguarding the commons.

2013]

CASE FOR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

779

While firms may tread carefully in order to avoid the undesired effects of
reciprocity, some might argue that the complete absence of reciprocity would
remove the key to keeping disparate parties together on a path of openness.1 54
For instance, without reciprocity, firms might simply take open-licensed
projects, use them as or in a product or service, but not share any modifications
that they make to them. Indeed, this happens today in the case of attributiononly projects such as Google's Android or in the world of Cloud computing,
where generally no distribution occurs and therefore no reciprocity or
attribution requirements apply.
However, several reasons suggest this potential "defection" problem is not
as severe as it may seem. First, if a firm were to take and close a project, it
almost certainly would not obtain the free (to it) labor that contributors around
the world are willing to provide to open-licensed projects. Without that free
labor, firms would lose the most significant advantages of open innovation, and
the free labor would likely remain loyal to the open version of the project.155
Firms thus already have incentives to open and contribute as much of their
materials as possible, since doing so will attract contributions and trigger
innovation and creative activity in directions that better suit the firm and its
strategic direction.15 6
Does reciprocity prevent defections from individual contributors? It seems
unlikely in most cases that individual contributors have the time, interest, or
resources to take from a non-reciprocal project and use it as the basis for a
closed one. The literature suggests that the purposes of individuals in
contributing to open-licensed projects often have little to do with direct
economic advantage; rather, their interests in contributing primarily lie in
creativity, reputation enhancement, and indirect economic rewards. 157 While it
does remain a possibility that individual contributors may take and close an
open-licensed project as part of their own product or service, and thus
technically defect from an open development model, the same reasons that
suggest firms are unlikely to do so suggest individual contributors are unlikely
to do so as well. Individual contributors may be even less likely to defect given
their purposes in being involved in open-licensed projects in the first place, as

Rather, the benefits of the commons approach to development have become clearer to more
and more
participants.
154
See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 144 (detailing one such example where Oracle
attempted to impose rules and standards on a FOSS community for a particular FOSS
project, to which the community responded by creating a separate project).
156 For a recent example of this phenomenon playing out, see About, TIZEN, https://
www.tizen.org/about (last visited Sept. 7, 2013), which discusses the Tizen FOSS project.
This relatively new FOSS project has been spearheaded by, among others, Samsung and
Sprint Nextel in order to decrease these companies' reliance on the Android operating
system
by providing an alternative software platform for smartphones and tablets.
157
See supra Part II.B.
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well as their much more limited resources to successfully close and then
maintain a project.
Some evidence even suggests that individual contributors are more likely to
contribute to open-licensed projects under an attribution-only type of license.158
While some contributors may like the idea that anything that they contribute can
only ever be used under the terms of a reciprocal license, the reasons discussed
above for why reciprocity may not be crucial to prevent a tragedy of the
commons suggest such attitudes may be the result of the effective marketing of
reciprocity more than anything else.
In reality, IP rights and reciprocity provide no guarantee against defections
in any event. In fact, they ensure the opposite possibility. For instance, in 2007
Oracle acquired MySQL, a database management system licensed under a
reciprocal license.1 59 Because Oracle now owns the IP rights in such system, it
can at any time close access to the source code and license MySQL under a
proprietary license. Although older versions of the software would still be
available under the reciprocal license, newer versions would not. Similarly, any
IP rights holder of an open-licensed project may at any time change the terms
under which its materials are licensed.160 While the older versions remain under
the open licenses, the rapid pace of software innovation, for instance, means
that those versions quickly become obsolete. IP rights and reciprocity, therefore,
are no guarantee with respect to an open development process unless the rights
holder chooses to continuously make it so.

3. Non-reciprocalSuccess Stories
The successes of projects licensed under attribution-only licenses also
suggest that the fear of defection is overstated. The example of Google's
Android is telling. Governed by the Apache 2.0 license, an attribution-only
FOSS license, anyone can take Android, significantly modify it, and not release
the source code to others.161 Amazon has done precisely that with a version of

15 8 See, e.g., Matthew Aslett, The Trend Towards Permissive Licensing, 451 CAOS

(June 6, 2011, 10:56 AM), http://blogs.the451group.com/opensource/2011/06/06/
the-trend-towards-permissive-licensing/; Matthew Aslett, On the Continuing Decline of the
GPL, 451 CAOS THEORY (Dec. 15, 2011, 11:24 AM) [hereinafter Aslett, Continuing
Decline], http://blogs.the451group.com/opensource/20 11/12/15/on-the-continuing-declineof-the-gpl/ (summarizing data trends that suggest use of reciprocal licenses is becoming
increasingly disfavored).
15 9
See Bryan Richard, Oracle Buys SUN; MySQL Is Forked, LINUX MAG. (Apr. 20,
2009), http://www.1inux-mag.com/id/7309/.
160 As many feared Google might do with Android. See infra note 163.
161 See generally Licenses, ANDROID, http://source.android.com/source/licenses.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (discussing the project's preference for Apache 2.0 and
articulating the reasons for such preference).
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Android for its line of tablets.1 62 But even Amazon retains an interest in
contributing improvements to the Google version of Android because it will
then avoid having to incorporate those changes into every new version of
Android that Google releases, and that it subsequently uses. Contributing its
changes to Android will also focus the broader community on its path of
development. And as discussed, contributors will remain dedicated to the open
version that Google offers. That free (to Google) labor would almost certainly
vanish once and if Google ever decided to close Android.163
The successes of hosted FOSS projects also suggest that the necessity of
reciprocity or attribution (in the form of IP notices) is often overstated. In the
FOSS world, hosting software is not generally considered a distribution of the
software,1 64 and open licenses in the FOSS world require a distribution before
reciprocity or attribution requirements become effective. Some have ominously
predicted that such Cloud computing may well spell the death of open license
movements. 165 And yet, hosted FOSS projects have flourished and continue to
do so, despite contributors knowing that third parties that take such software
and use it to host their products and services will not be required to provide any
contributors with attribution or contribute any of their improvements back to the
project.166
Would such projects be even more successful if all third parties hosting the
software were required to provide attribution or access to their improvements?
This is the idea behind some reciprocal licenses, which define hosting as a
distribution that triggers the attribution and reciprocity requirements.16 7
It is impossible to predict the outcome of such a counterfactual, but there
are reasons to doubt that such an approach would lead to greater success. And
most of these reasons are similar to the reasons for why reciprocity in general
162 G.F., Tablets: Forking Android, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2011, http://www.econo

mist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/09/tablets (discussing Amazon's at-the-time intent to "fork"
Android by building its own private layer on top of FOSS Android).
16 3 Google did stall the FOSS release of one version of Android in 2011, which led
to
significant backlash in the developer community. See, e.g., Edward J. Naughton, Google's
Android: Closing the Honeycomb Code May Open a Legal Can of Worms, HUFFINGTON

POST (May 5, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-j-naughton/googlesandroid-closing-t b 857728.html (discussing significant outrage amongst the developer
community in response to the delayed release of the Honeycomb version of Android).
164 One exception is the Affero General Public License, which expressly defines hosting
software as a distribution of such software. See Free Software Found., GNU Affero General
Public License, Version 3,

GNU

OPERATING SYS.

(Nov.

19,

2007), http://www.

gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.html (indicating in the Preamble that one of the primary purposes
of the license is to include hosting as a form of distribution that triggers reciprocity
requirements).
165 Tim

O'Reilly,

Open

Source

Paradigm Shift,

O'REILLY

(June

2004),

http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/articles/paradigmshift_0504.html.
16 6 For instance, a significant proportion of the world's web servers run on Linux, a
reciprocal-licensed FOSS project. Because the servers are not distributed and simply host the
websites, however, no open license requirements are triggered.
167 See, e.g., Free Software Found., supra note 164.
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helps little. First, it is likely that firms would simply design around or avoid
reciprocity requirements inimical to their interests, much as they already do.
Significant transaction costs without an offsetting benefit would be the primary
result. Furthermore, firms already have incentives to contribute and make
available to the open-licensed projects as much of their innovations as possible,
since doing so may focus the broader community on their path of development
for the software and draw attention to issues that the firm was unable or
unwilling to resolve itself Attempting to force firms' hands would likely only
deter their involvement, if anything. 168
Aside from firms, would individual contributors contribute more to hosted
projects if they knew other users would be required to attribute them and make
their improvements available? It also seems unlikely. Again, it seems dubious
that the promise of an IP notice in an obscure attribution compilation provides
much of a lure at all. The motivations of most individual contributors discussed
above suggest that IP rights have little to do with their participation. It is
possible that some contributors have held back from contributing to hosted
FOSS projects because of the lack of IP attribution or reciprocity. But again, the
available survey evidence suggests that such concerns are not the primary
motivations for contributors to FOSS projects. 169
IV. THE MERITS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Thus far this Article has argued that relying on IP rights in open license
movements has had mixed results. While open license movements have yielded
tremendous amounts of innovation and creativity in both the FOSS and Creative
Commons worlds, the role of IP rights in these movements has resulted in
significant transaction costs for those wishing to use and contribute materials to
such movements. And these transaction costs slow innovation and creativity,
particularly in the corporate setting. While some may argue that these costs are
simply the price society must pay in order to have significant amounts of
software and content available under such permissive license terms, the above
discussion casts doubt on the necessity of IP rights to achieve these results.
The next section explores why a public domain approach might be a better
solution in many contexts. In addition to eliminating some of the abovediscussed transaction costs, a public domain approach would also arguably still
satisfy the motivations of most contributors to open-licensed projects, reduce
the risk of IP trolls down the road, and better align-both in theory and in
practice-with the goals of open license movements.

168

See Tim O'Reilly, Open Source and Cloud Computing, O'REILLY RADAR (July 31,
2008), http://radar.oreilly.com/2008/07/open-source-and-cloud-computing.html (discussing
threats to FOSS via Cloud Computing in terms of the architectural design of projects, rather
than licensing terms).
169 See supra Part II.B.
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A. A PublicDomain Primer
Before assessing the merits of a public domain approach, it is necessary to
more clearly define what such an approach entails. In the IP world, the most
common conception of the public domain means that materials are not subject
to IP rights because such rights have either expired or been waived, or because
the materials were not eligible for IP rights in the first place.1 70 Each area of IP
law-copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret-defines what materials are
eligible for protection, how long the protection lasts, and how one obtains or
relinquishes the protection. The laws of each country may also answer these
questions differently.
Under U.S. law, software and content showing at least a modicum of
originality automatically obtain copyright protection as soon as they are fixed in
a tangible form that is perceptible either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. 171 No registration is thus required, although in the U.S. copyright
holders must register their work in order to bring certain legal actions relating to
the copyrighted work. 172
Patents, conversely, do not automatically obtain upon development of an
invention. Instead, in the United States, one must file a patent application and
satisfy the requirements of the Patent Act-patentable subject matter, novelty,
non-obviousness, utility, and disclosure-before obtaining a patent on an
invention.173 Creative Commons content generally would be ineligible for
patent protection, whereas software would be so long as it satisfied these
requirements.174 A close cousin to patent law, trade secret law, generally
protects information that derives independent economic value from not being
known or readily ascertainable, and which is the subject of reasonable efforts to
maintain its secrecy.1 75 Often firms choose between patent and trade secret
protection for a particular invention. 176

17 0 See

Pamela Samuelson, EnrichingDiscourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783,
791 (2006) (reviewing thirteen different academic conceptions of what constitutes the
"public domain," while acknowledging that the conception discussed in this Article
constitutes the conception that the U.S. Supreme Court generally relies on in its
jurisprudence).
171 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
72

1 Id. § 408(a); Matthew P. Gelfand, A Perfect (Copyright) Union: Uniting Registration
and License Designation, 25 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 711, 724 (2012) (detailing some of the

litigation-related benefits of registering).
173 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (patentable subject matter and utility), 102 (novelty),
103 (non-obviousness), and 112 (enablement and written description) (2006).
174 See, e.g., Michael Mattioli, Communities ofInnovation, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 103, 134
n.201 (2012) (citing to a list of cases in the 1990s that clearly established software as patent
eligible).
175 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012).
61

176 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights,
STAN. L. REv. 311, 339-41 (2008) (discussing various reasons why inventors might
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Last, trademark law grants a party the right to use a mark as an indicator of
the source of goods or services and to prevent others from using the same mark
in connection with similar goods and services.1 77 One of trademark law's
primary purposes, therefore, is to protect consumers from confusion about the
source of a good in the marketplace.1 78 Firms often register a mark under the
federal Lanham Act in order to obtain nationwide trademark protection,1 79
although state common law can also provide firms with trademark rights based
on actual usage of the marks.' 8 0
A public domain approach, therefore, would need to effectively override
any automatic copyright rights, waive any patent rights (both with respect to
any patent rights already obtained as well as prospective rights), and relinquish
any remedies that come with either. Trade secret rights, if any, would be
inapplicable as soon as the rights holder released the software or content to the
public. Arguably waiving any trademark rights is not only unnecessary but
inadvisable, since others could then use the marks to confuse consumers as to
the source of the software or content. Indeed, this is precisely why the Creative
Commons, which includes a public domain dedication tool in its repertoire of
legal documents, expressly exempts trademark rights from the tool's scope.181
How to waive copyright and patent rights is not always a straightforward
matter, however.182 Part IV of this Article explores some of the difficulties in
dedicating materials to the public domain and the merits of a "Public Domain
Act" intended to supplement the various IP Acts in the United States by more
clearly charting out a path to dedicating materials to the public domain. But
before turning to that task, the case for a public domain approach in the FOSS,
Creative Commons, and other open innovation movements must be more fully
made.

choose patent protection over trade secret protection, and vice-versa). See generally Andrew
A. Schwartz, The CorporatePreferencefor Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623 (2013).

177 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
178 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MIcH. L. REV. 137,
142-46 (2010) (discussing the various rationales that courts offer in favor of extending
trademark protection to trademark owners, the most prominent of which is to prevent
consumer confusion).
179 Trademark Registration (Lanham) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012)).
I80 See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Frequently Asked Questions About

Trademarks, USPTO.Gov, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp (last modified Apr. 23,
2013, 10:26 AM) ("Federal registration is not required to establish rights in a trademark.
Common law rights arise from actual use of a mark and may allow the common law user to
successfully challenge a registration or application.").
18 1 Frequently Asked Questions, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/

Frequently Asked Questions (last modified July 29, 2013, 11:45 AM).

182 See Robert P. Merges, To Waive and Waive Not: Property and Flexibility in the
Digital Era, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113, 113 (2011) (discussing ways to address "knotty

issues surrounding legal requirements for waiver of intellectual property rights").
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B. Transaction Costs Redux
A public domain approach in open innovation movements would not mean
that transaction costs would disappear entirely. Most firms, for instance, would
still likely vet public domain materials on intake for several reasons. For
example, someone without the rights to do so may have purported to place
materials in the public domain, and thus firms would likely want to review
materials to determine if the public domain designation passes muster.
Furthermore, public domain materials still suffer from the issue of not having
the backing of a third party that can provide the user with indemnities and
warranties. Although this is an issue with open-licensed materials today, a
public domain approach would do nothing to address it. Consequently, firms
may still incur transaction costs in vetting such public domain materials on
intake.
Furthermore, in the M&A context acquirers would still likely want to know
what materials at the target company are in the public domain, how they got
there, and whether such designation affects the value of their proposed
acquisition. M&A due diligence and the costs thereof, therefore, would also not
simply go away.
Some internal management costs would also certainly survive. Firms may
generally want to know the source of third-party materials used at the firm and
so may still incur costs in managing and tracking public domain materials and,
potentially, keeping them segregated from other materials. And firms may still
develop and provide training about their internal policies for using and
contributing materials to the public domain.
Firms would also continue to incur some outbound costs if a public domain
approach replaced an IP-licensing one. Firms may want to disclaim liability and
indemnification for such materials, for instance, in both the end user and
commercial agreement context. In the end user context, standard disclaimers
that firms already include in their end user agreements would likely address this
issue. But in commercial negotiations, obtaining such a disclaimer could be
difficult in many contexts and therefore result in some transaction costs.
Firms would also continue to incur costs when contributing to projects that
adopt a public domain approach. They would still, for instance, in many cases
desire to conduct outbound reviews to ensure that no copyright or patent rights
were compromised contrary to the interests or policies of the firm.
Despite these remaining costs, however, a public domain approach, if done
right, promises to significantly reduce them. On intake, for instance, firms
would not need to deal with the hundreds of different types of open licenses that
are currently used. Some have cited license proliferation as a major problem,183
including significant concerns about whether and to what extent licenses may
183

See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License Proliferation: Helpful
Diversity or Hopeless Confusion?, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 261, 279-82 (discussing the

pros and cons of license proliferation in general).
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coexist. 184 A straightforward public domain designation would allow firms to
make faster decisions on whether the materials may be used.
In the M&A context, transaction costs would almost certainly be reduced as
well. For instance, the acquiring firm would not need to concern itself with
license compliance and compatibility issues, whether in the past or going
forward. It may still require audits in order to understand the assets it is
acquiring, but the public domain materials would not come with the issues of
potential IP remedies or reciprocity. Some issues around the validity of the
materials being in the public domain at all may still arise, but no more so than in
the open license context today.
Internal management costs would also certainly decline. While firms may
still incur some costs in segregating and tracking public domain materials, as
well as developing and administering their policies on use of public domain
materials, they would not need to concern themselves with the requirements of
reciprocity, attribution, and license compatibility as in the open license context.
Such management, therefore, would be done for internal efficiency reasons
rather than legal ones. This is a positive result in terms of innovation since such
tracking focuses on improving products and services rather than helping ensure
compliance with a set of rules, which is often undertaken simply to avoid the
effect of such rules (e.g., reciprocity or IP remedies).
Outbound costs would diminish as well. Firms would avoid spending the
significant amounts of time they currently do building license-compliant
attribution documents and source code repositories. They would also avoid the
costs of designing around the effects of reciprocity and license incompatibilities
and conducting outbound audits to ensure that the effects of reciprocity are
contained in accordance with firm policies. Although some outbound audits
may still be done, they would almost certainly not be as significant given the
absence of reciprocity and licensing requirements in general.
Negotiations with third parties in commercial agreements would also see
more efficient results. Although third parties may still want to know about
public domain materials included in a product or service, and these concerns
may affect negotiations, the potential effects of reciprocity and IP remedies are
typically the most pressing concerns of the parties in such negotiations. A
public domain approach would remove these concerns and therefore improve
the efficiency of the negotiations.

C. Containingthe Prospectof Trolls
Another significant benefit of a public domain approach would be to limit
the likelihood of IP "trolls." IP "trolls" are generally owners of IP rights that do
184Id. at 281-82; see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and
Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REv. 549, 634-35 (2010) (discussing the significant
costs that may result when attempting to reconcile the various conflicting terms of the
numerously available and used open licenses); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 943-44 (2008).
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not make products or engage in creative activity themselves, but instead focus
on asserting their IP rights against those that do in order to extract licensing
fees. 185 At first blush, the likelihood of open license movements taking on the
characteristics of IP trolls may seem slim. As discussed, rent-seeking or even
the traditional economic incentives of IP rights are not generally what motivate
individuals and firms to contribute to open-licensed projects.186 The limited
amount and nature of case law surrounding open-licensed materials, despite
evidence suggesting significant license non-compliance, provides some
confirmation to this.' 87 Indeed, the primary motivation behind most of the suits
that have been brought seems to be simply a desire to have the violators follow
the relevant license requirements.18 8
But this mostly benevolent behavior could change. This possibility seems
especially stark in the case of copyright. The recent example of Righthaven, the
now defunct copyright "troll" responsible for filing numerous cases on behalf of
its clients against users of its clients' copyrighted materials, illustrates this
possibility. 189 So long as open-licensed materials remain subject to copyright,
similar (albeit perhaps better orchestrated) suits are possible in the open license
world.
While it is perhaps unlikely that such suits will materialize so long as the
materials remain in the possession of the original rights holders, a dour
economy and the counsel of a copyright troll might change the status quo.
Furthermore, bankruptcies and other acts of insolvency could release the
copyrighted materials into the hands of owners lacking the benign mindset of
many contributors to open-licensed projects.1 90 Because statutory damages and
injunctive relief are available for violations of copyright in the United States, 19 1
obtaining rents might be especially tempting since such potential liabilities
make obtaining settlement payments that much easier. 192

18 5 See Lemley & Melamed, supranote 24, at 1; COLLEEN V. CHIEN, PATENT ASSERTION

ENTITIES 1-5, 21-22 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/
presentations/290073.pdf (providing a variety of definitions for what constitutes a "patent
assertion entity," another common name applied to trolls).
18 6

See supra Part II.B.
18 7 See supra Part II.B.
18 8
See supra Part II.B.
18 9 See generally Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2011: Copyright and Trade Secret
Cases, 10 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 331, 333 (2012) (describing the Righthaven

litigation).
19 0

See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder,25

HARv. J.L. & TECH. 687, 691 (2012) (discussing how patent trolls often acquire patents in
bankruptcy proceedings).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
191
92

1 See Constance Boutsikaris, The Rise of Copyright Trolls in a Digital Information
Economy: New Litigation Business Strategies and Their Impact on Innovation, 20
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 391, 401-03 (2012) (discussing the business strategy of

Righthaven in threatening significant statutory damages for what in some instances turned
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Rent-seeking by definition has little to do with innovation. Instead, it
hampers it. In the patent space, commentary regarding the negative effects of
patent trolls on innovation has been significant. 19 3 While such troll-like
behavior in the copyright space has not been widespread, it is better to ensure
that it remains so. A public domain approach would help do precisely that.
The prospect of patent trolls buying up or obtaining patents from FOSS
communities that read on open-licensed materials and eventually wielding the
patents against FOSS users may be less worrisome. 194 In most cases FOSS
projects don't pursue patents on their technologies for a number of reasons. 195
Many of the projects are run by a collection of individual contributors across the
world. Filing for and obtaining patents is costly,196 and these collectives of
individuals in most cases are unlikely to have undertaken such activity due to
these costs, 197 especially since their motivations in contributing have little to do
out to be "fair use" under copyright law, while offering to accept a significantly lower
amount as settlement of the claims).
193 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV.

(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=
2146251 (discussing the negative effects of patent troll activity on startup companies); Tom
Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH L. REv. 1, 23-25

(discussing a new form of behavior somewhat akin to troll-like behavior, what they call
"mass aggregators" of patents, which behavior, while possibly resulting in some benefits,
also has the effect of potentially slowing innovation); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities
Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 613-14 (2008) (labeling

the patent troll problem as a form of "patent hold-up" because such trolls extort more value
from third parties than their patent is actually worth); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991, 1992-93 (2007) (discussing the

excessive power patent trolls may hold over complex products through ownership of a patent
covering a single component in such complex product); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries
and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809,

1832-37 (2007) (discussing several possible means by which to prevent troll-like behavior);
Simon Phipps, Numbers Don'tLie: Patent Trolls Are a Plague, INFOWORLD (Oct. 19, 2012,

3:00 AM), http://www.infoworld.com/d/open-source-software/numbers-dont-lie-patenttrolls-are-plague-205192 (discussing the ill effects of patent trolls on innovation).
194 Of course, the prospect of patent trolls using other patents against open-licensed
projects remains real, but that subject is beyond the scope of this Article.
195 See generally Mann, supra note 53, at 21-22 (discussing reasons why FOSS
developers generally do not obtain patents, but why, given the environment in which they
exist, they may need to in order to survive); Schultz & Urban, supra note 20, at 10-14
(discussing the cultural and political reasons why open license communities do not generally
patent their technologies).
196 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaininga Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Jan.
28, 2011, 1:14 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/01/28/the-cost-of-obtaining-patent/
id=14668/ (providing a range of estimates, starting at $5,000 and ending at $15,000 or
more); Michael Neustel, How Much Does a Patent Cost?, NEUSTEL LAW OFFICES,

http://www.patent-ideas.com/Patent-Costs-Fees/How-Much-Does-A-Patent-Cost.aspx
visited Nov. 2, 2012) (providing similar ranges).
197

(last

See Simon Phipps, Why Software PatentsAre Evil, INFOWORLD (Mar. 16, 2012, 3:00

AM), http://www.infoworld.com/d/open-source-software/why-software-patents-are-evil-188
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with IP rights or obtaining direct economic remuneration. 19 8 The unlikelihood
of patents for FOSS projects increases given that many FOSS licenses include
automatic patent licenses to downstream users. 19 9 So the reward of obtaining
patents on the technology-being able to exclude others from using such
technology absent a patent license-in many cases by default has already been
given away. 200
Furthermore, even in cases where the rights holders do find reasons to file
for patents-for instance, as a defensive mechanism vis-A-vis third partiessuch realization in many cases may simply come too late. Under U.S. patent law
a creator has one year from releasing or using materials in public to file a patent
on the technology. 20 1 After that time period, any possible patent rights
expire. 202 The collective nature of many FOSS projects, and the non-IP centric
motivations of those behind them, makes it likely that this alone would prevent
many from filing for patents or being eligible to do so. In cases of wellorganized, corporate open-licensed projects-for instance, Red Hat's version of
Linux-firms may in fact pursue patents, although reluctantly in most cases
given the general hostility to software patents in FOSS communities. 203 Even in
these cases, though, open innovation communities may face both informal and
formal challenges to obtaining patents on their technologies. 204
Even if the risk of patent trolls "from within" is limited, a public domain
approach that effectively waives patent rights could still help guard against that
risk. Of course, users of such materials would remain vulnerable to suits from
738?page=0,2 (indicating that FOSS communities often lack the resources to mount a patent
defense by, for example, acquiring patents).
198 Indeed, some in the FOSS world view software patents as evil and thus eschew
software patents as a matter of principle. See, e.g., Julie Bort, The Defensive PatentLicense
Makes Patents Less Evil for Open Source, NETWORKWORLD (May 7, 2010, 1:42 PM),

http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/defensive-patent-license-makes-patents-less

-e (indicating that FOSS developers "notoriously shy away from pursuing software patents
[because] [t]he concept is ugly to them").
199

Christian H. Nadan, Closing the Loophole: Open Source Licensing & the Implied
Patent License, 26 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1 (2009), available at http://www.

scribd.com/doc/4608808 1/Closing-the-Loophole-Open-Source-Licensing-amp-the-ImpliedPatent-License-Nadan (indicating that some FOSS licenses include express patent licenses,
while the others may contain implied patent licenses).
200Id. at 1, 4.

201 Laurence P. Colton, Intellectual Property, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2012)

(indicating that this "statutory bar" to obtaining a patent remains in effect following
enactment of the America Invents Act of 2011).
202 Id
203

See Statement of Position and Our Promise on Software Patents,
RED HAT,

http://www.redhat.com/legal/patentpolicy.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (indicating that
the firm intends to pursue software patents, despite being opposed to them in principle, in
order to help defend FOSS against IP trolls and other aggressive patent holders).
2 04
See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Inmovation 5-7 (July 30, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2289326 (reviewing some of these challenges).
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trolls that have obtained patents that read on the dedicated materials, but that is
a result of the current U.S. patent system rather than an issue with a public
domain approach. Much like the current open license approach, a public domain
approach could help limit the number of potential patents reading on the
dedicated materials by expanding the prior art. 205 And, a public domain
approach, if implemented well, could better limit the number of patents that
might be asserted against such materials (since, for instance, not all FOSS
licenses include patent licenses). Section IV below discusses how a public
domain approach might best be implemented in order to address these and
related patent issues. So long as materials remain subject to IP rights, however,
the prospect of trolls, in the patent world but especially in the case of copyright,
remains more likely.

D. Satisfying Contributors
A possibly fatal counterargument to the public domain approach is simply
this: if contributors to open-licensed projects preferred such an approach, they
could have already adopted it.20 6 But they largely have not. Instead, in the
FOSS world, the most popular license remains the General Public License, a
reciprocal license. 207 Large numbers of developers also prefer the Apache
License, an attribution-only license. 208 In the Creative Commons world, some
evidence suggests that participants prefer more restrictive Creative Commons
licenses.2 09 One might infer from this evidence that whatever the issues with the
IP license approach, contributors prefer it.
But there are reasons to doubt this inference. In the FOSS world, for
instance, there is no recognized or widely used public domain dedication
tool. 2 10 Instead, the Open Source Initiative and the Free Software Foundation205 For challenges that open license communities face in expanding the prior art through
contributions of technology under open licenses, see Schultz & Urban, supra note 20, at 22.
206 Expert Statement of Bruce Perens at 2, Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925
2009) (No. C06-1905-JSW).
(N.D.20 Cal.
7
See, e.g., Top 20 Open Source Licenses, BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE, http://www.black
ducksoftware.com/resources/data/top-20-open-source-licenses (last visited Oct. 12, 2013)
that the GPL Version 2.0 is the most popular FOSS license).
(indicating
20 8
Id (indicating that the Apache license is the second most popular FOSS license).
209 On the popular photo-sharing site, Flickr, for instance, an analysis in 2009 suggested
that those choosing to license their photos under a Creative Commons license by and large
choose Creative Commons licenses that contain restrictions, for instance, around commercial
use or making derivative works of the photos. See Michelle Thorne, Analysis of] OOM CCLicensed Images on Flickr, CREATIVE COMMONS (Mar. 25, 2009), http://creativecommons.

org/weblog/entry/13588; see also Giorgos Cheliotis, CC Stats, HOIKOINOI (Jul. 2, 2007,
10:58 PM), http://hoikoinoi.wordpress.com/2007/07/02/cc-stats/ (indicating that most
contributors choosing Creative Commons licenses for their content prefer a version that
restricts commercial use).
2 10
There have been attempts to create such a tool and movement towards the public
domain. See, e.g., UNLICENSE YOURSELF, supra note 19.
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the two leading FOSS advocacy organizations in the world-vet and approve
open licenses for uA in the community. 2 11 While it is true that various projects
could simply ignore these recommended licenses and adopt a public domain
approach-and some have attempted to do precisely that 2 12-that sentiment
assumes that the organizers of such projects understand how to do so. Section
IV below, which discusses the complexities involved in dedicating materials to
the public domain and some possible changes in the law that may help make
doing so easier, suggests dedicating materials to the public domain is not as
straightforward of a matter as some suggest. 2 13
The open licenses in the FOSS world and the Creative Commons licenses in
the Creative Commons world, conversely, provide contributors with vetted and
well-known legal tools for making materials available to the public. Indeed, in
some cases contributors believe that using such open licenses in fact does
contribute their materials to the public domain.2 14 Given the availability of these
licenses, the significant roles of the licensing bodies in creating and advancing
the open license movements, and the complexities in dedicating materials to the
public domain, it is no surprise, then, that more projects have not adopted a
public domain approach.
In the Creative Commons world, a public domain dedication tool does exist,
and yet most open-licensed materials in the Creative Commons world appear to
be licensed under non-public domain, copyright licenses. 2 15 Part of the reason
for this may lie simply in the belief that reciprocity helps build up the commons
by ensuring that others license their improvements or derivative works
211 See Asay, supra note 39, at 268-71 (summarizing the two organizations' roles in
promoting
FOSS and approving FOSS licenses based on each group's definition of FOSS).
2 12
See UNLICENSE YOURSELF, supra note 19 (providing a list of projects that have taken
the public
domain approach to FOSS).
2 13

See Expert Statement of Bruce Perens, supra note 206 (suggesting that dedicating

materials to the public domain is, in fact, simple). Perens also anecdotally indicates that

developers have known how to dedicate materials to the public domain for years and simply
have chosen not to due to the benefits that the IP approach provides. This author's own

experiences working with many engineers over the years on open-licensing issues suggest
this is far from accurate. Engineers often believe licensing the materials under an open
license is, essentially, dedicating the materials to the public domain. Furthermore, a variety
of open licenses that the author has encountered in actual practice include a copyright notice,
then some language purportedly dedicating the material to the public domain, followed by
some conditions of use, which all suggest that those licensing the materials in such a manner
clearly do not understand what the public domain entails.
2 14
Academic literature also at times treats open-licensed materials as belonging to the
public domain, so it is not surprising that non-lawyers sometimes come to the same
conclusion. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, WHY THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MATTERS: THE
ENDANGERED WELLSPRING OF CREATIVITY, COMMERCE AND DEMOCRACY 14, 24 (2002)

(suggesting that FOSS development helps expand the public domain); Lisa Mandrusiak,
Balancing Open Source Paradigms and Traditional Intellectual Property Models To
Optimize Innovation, 63 ME. L. REv. 303, 304 (2010) (indicating that FOSS licensing
promotes
contributing materials to the public domain); Merges, supra note 7, at 190-93.
2 15
See supranote 209 and accompanying text.
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similarly. 2 16 However, as argued throughout, there are reasons to doubt that
reciprocity in fact has that effect, at least where subsequent users do not already
desire such a result. Instead, it can and often does deter third partiesparticularly firms-from using the materials due to concerns about the reach of
reciprocity. Or, in the FOSS world, they simply design around the effects of
reciprocity in many cases.
Nonetheless, attribution may still provide a reason to maintain an IP
approach to open innovation. Contributors to open-licensed projects often
suggest that the "signaling effects" and reputational benefits they receive from
their contributions are significant drivers in why they contribute in the first
place. 2 17 But an lIP approach is not the only way, or even the best way, to satisfy
such goals. In the FOSS world, as discussed, it is hard to imagine that the
typical attribution provides the type of recognition that contributors rely on as a
motivation, since such attributions are generally buried in the product or service
documentation, where no one but lawyers see them. Instead, tools such as
GitHub likely represent a more powerful means of providing the desired
recognition. 2 18
Furthermore, even if some inventors and creators do wish for a formal
attribution in materials that make use of their works, an IP notice solution seems
like a suboptimal one. Technological solutions to attribution could potentially
provide the same attribution-or perhaps even better provide it by automating
the attribution or making it an integral part of the work-while also removing
the threat of IP remedies that reduce the speed of innovation and creative
activity by introducing the transaction costs detailed above.
Even absent a formal legal requirement for attribution, community norms
could also help dictate such a result. In the Creative Commons' FAQ regarding
the public domain, for instance, the organization notes that while the public
domain dedication tool does not require that subsequent users provide any sort
of attribution to the original author, community norms (such as with scientific
or academic citations) may still strongly encourage attribution. 2 19 Such norms
could serve the same role in a public domain approach to innovation.

2 16

Rufus Pollock, Why Share-Alike Licenses Are Open but Non-commercial Ones
Aren 't, OPEN KNOWLEDGE FoUND. BLOG (June 24, 2010), http://blog.okfn.org/2010/

06/24/why-share-alike-licenses-are-open-but-non-commercial-ones-arent/ (suggesting that
share-alike in the Creative Commons world may help build up the commons by promoting
contributions
back into it).
2 17
See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
2 18

See, e.g., Erez Zukerman, Why You Should Contribute to Open Source Projects

[Opinion], MAKEUSEOF (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/contributeopensource-projects/ (discussing the advantages of an active GitHub profile, including
allowing potential employers to recognize all the software code that a person has written and
generating significant numbers of followers).
2 19
See CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 181.
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E. Reconciling a Vision
Richard Stallman, considered by some as the "prophet" or "philosopher
king" of the FOSS movement, 220 has written a series of essays arguing against
IP rights in software. For instance, in an essay titled, Why Software Should Not
Have Owners, he provocatively writes that "' [c]ontrol over the use of one's
ideas' really constitutes control over other people's lives; and it is usually used
to make their lives more difficult." 2 2 1 Consequently, from Stallman's point of
view, as an ethical matter "a person should not [enforce copyrights] regardless
of whether the law enables him to" because doing so harms society as a
whole. 222
In a related essay, Why Software Should Be Free, Stallman argues against
ownership rights in software because rights owners often impose restrictions on
the software's use, and such restrictions "only interfere [with use of the
software] ... [s]o the effect can only be negative." 223 Such obstructions result
in fewer people using, adapting, and fixing the software, and therefore fewer
people benefiting from it. 224 In essence, Stallman argues against IP rights in
software because these rights lead to a tragedy of the anti-commons.
Naturally Stallman does not have his own IP licensing approach in mind
when assessing this anti-commons issue. Instead, he is focused on software
licensing models that prohibit access to source code and charge licensing fees
for use of the software. But reciprocity and the other effects of employing IP
rights on behalf of openness and freedom have similar obstructive effects on
use, adaptation, and adoption, as discussed above. 225 Stallman himself later
admits that the particular mode of restricting sharing is irrelevant. As he puts it:
"how .

.

. obstruction is carried out .

.

. doesn't affect the conclusion .

.

. if it

harm." 226

succeeds in preventing use, it does
Nonetheless, though the IP approach may be a suboptimal one, the
architects of open license movements argue that it is a necessary evil. Without
it, defectors would quickly deplete the commons, resulting in a tragedy of the
commons. Reciprocity, according to this argument, prevents such a tragedy by
rendering concerns about the long-term viability of open-licensed projects
moot; reciprocity assures users that the project will remain open and
available. 22 7 Accordingly, they will continue to participate in and contribute to
the commons. 228 Eben Moglen cites the reciprocity-based IP approach as the
220See STALLMAN, supra note 6 (book blurbs from Tim Berners-Lee and Simon L.
Garfinkel).
221 Id at 33.
222 Id at 34.
223Id at 46.
224 d.
225
226

227

See supra Part III.B-C.
STALLMAN, supra note 6, at 50.

Moglen, supra note 37.

228 d.
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"central institutional structure" responsible for the FOSS movement's success
and the GPL, the Free Software Foundation's primary reciprocal license, as
Stallman's greatest achievement. 229
These arguments prove unconvincing. Part IL.C above provided arguments
as to why the IP-induced anti-commons are not a necessary evil in order to
prevent a tragedy of the commons. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that a
tragedy of the commons in the true sense of the phrase never results absent
reciprocity. For instance, if software or content is in the public domain,
subsequent users are not then able to "subtract" from the commons because
each person's use of the software or content is "nonrivalrous." Hence, though
subsequent users of public domain materials may not contribute changes to the
commons, and thereby fail to expand the commons, their "defections" would
not remove materials from the commons. The size of the commons would
simply remain the same. 2 30
But is reciprocity responsible for the existence of the commons at all? Put
another way, even if reciprocity does not prevent a true tragedy of the
commons, would the commons simply not exist, or stop growing after a few
initial contributions, without reciprocity? Such a result might be viewed as a
form of depleting the commons, and thus a form of a tragedy of the commons.
In the FOSS world, for instance, reciprocity seems to have played a role in
promoting Linux as a counterweight to Microsoft's operating system. 23 1 At
least some developers may have been motivated by the understanding that,
because of Linux's reciprocity requirement, corporate competitors to Microsoft
could not simply take their hard work and close it back up. This factor may
have been especially critical early on in the FOSS movement, when developer
communities were less interconnected and thus less capable of collaborating in
order to compete against such potential defectors. 232
But arguably reciprocity's time has come and gone. If Linux were in the
public domain or under an attribution-only license, for instance, and firms used
it without releasing their changes in source code form, this would in no way
impinge upon others' rights to use the public domain or attribution-only
version. And that version would likely continue to attract contributions, both
from independent developers and firms, for the variety of extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations discussed above. 233 The firm that took without giving back would
be relegated to hoarding its own version in a technical corner, hoping that future
developments advance in a direction favorable to the firm. It would not,
however, be able to attract developers to its own version except by hiring them.
229 Id.

230 For an analysis of why analogizing IP to real property, with its concomitant focus on
seeking out and stopping free riders, is misguided, see Mark A. Lemley, Property,
IntellectualProperty,and FreeRiding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1046-69 (2005).
231 See Merges, supra note 7, at 193.
232

Moglen, supra note 37, at 14 (indicating that the interconnectedness that the Internet
made open innovation more practical and feasible).
enabled
233
See supra Part II.B.
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Forking software projects and then closing them, therefore, in some ways is its
own punishment. 23 4
Put another way: peer production models of innovation have built-in
mechanisms that reinforce contributing to the commons rather than trying to
hoard pieces of it, and such built-in mechanisms have little to do with IP rights.
Firms that attempt to hoard pieces of the commons effectively cannot because
the goods are nonrivalrous, and when they attempt to do so, they simply cut
themselves off from free (to them) labor-at least with respect to changes that
they make to their hoarded version-and in some cases influencing the direction
of the project. They lose the very benefits of open innovation. These benefits
may not have been clear to firms in the beginning, when reciprocity may have
played a bigger role in advancing this alternative model of innovation, but they
seem clear now.
As discussed above, the successes of attribution-only licensed projects and
hosted FOSS projects also provide real-world evidence suggesting that
reciprocity is less of a driving force behind creating the commons than is often
claimed, at least today.235 As also argued, it is also doubtful that reciprocity
frequently forces firms' hands. Instead, firms generally contribute when it
makes strategic sense for them, but otherwise often design around or avoid
certain reciprocal licenses altogether. 236
Ironically, much of this seemed clear to the architects of the open license IP
approach from the beginning. Eben Moglen, in critiquing IP regimes as applied
to software, decries the "econodwarf" perspective that IP rights are necessary in
order to provide creators with incentives to create. 237 Instead, he claims that the
Internet helps connect people, who then engage each other in creative activities
for their own pleasure "and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too
alone." 2 38 The desire to engage in creative activity and share that experience
with others, in Moglen's view, is the driving force behind the FOSS
movement. 2 39 Stallman comes to similar conclusions. 240 And surveys of
participants in open license movements confirm that such goals play a
significant role in motivating many of them to participate. 2 4 1
Moglen goes on to argue that the "field strength" of the IP system is the
primary obstruction to such creativity growing exponentially. 242 Stallman

234 Raymond, supra note 19 (early luminary of FOSS movement indicating that veering
from open innovation becomes its own punishment because open innovation has proven
itself over time as more efficient).
235
See supra Part III.C.
236

237

Supra Part III.B.

Moglen, supranote 37.

238 Id.
239 Id.
240

STALLMAN, supranote 6, at 34-35, 51-54.
241 See Engelhardt,supra note 47.
242
Moglen, supra note 37.
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expresses similar sentiments, 24 3 although of course both are focused on the
traditional LIP approach, rather than their own. But as discussed above, the IP
approach used in open license movements today results in many of the same
issues that they identify with the traditional IP approach: a version of the
tragedy of the anti-commons. And, as this Article argues, in most cases all for
naught.
To some extent it is unsurprising that the architects of the open license
movements adopted an IP approach despite the normative framework they laid
out for why non-IP models of innovation are superior and sustainable. In the
FOSS context, for instance, Stallman had experienced firsthand how proprietary
firms had grown over software products, and how these restrictive approaches
to software ownership prevented engineers from using and improving
software. 244 Expecting Stallman and other early leaders in the FOSS movement
to trust firms to accept their normative arguments, when firms had in fact
rejected them, is therefore dubious. Instead, Stallman and others responded to
firms with a dose of their own medicine, with a twist: an IP license-the
General Public License-that commanded adherence to their normative
precepts. 245
But again, this LIP strategy, while understandable in context, belies the
normative vision offered by Stallman and others and slows innovation and
creative activity unnecessarily in many cases. And as this Article has argued,
this anti-commons is not a necessary evil to prevent a greater tragedy of the
commons. Moglen was right-many people do seem to be motivated by
creativity and the ability to share it with others. Direct economic rewards are
not the only end for which people and firms will work. And IP rights often
simply get in the way, as Stallman argued.
Realigning the normative visions of open license movements with the actual
mechanics of such movements would, therefore, prove beneficial. But such
benefits are more than simply spurring innovation and creativity by reducing the
transaction costs discussed above. Adopting a public domain approach to open
development would better foster norms of free and open access than the current
IP approach does. Put simply: such an approach would more ably push back
against the very idea of strong IP rights in software and other types of content, a
primary objective of open license movements.
For instance, the more that software and content is available in the public
domain, the more difficult it becomes for firms or others to appear credible in
asserting strong IP rights over it, whatever the law on the books may be. The
FOSS and Creative Commons movements have already helped create some of
this type of pressure in the software and content worlds. For instance, one
reason that firms are careful to comply with open licenses, and one reason that
they often choose open-licensed solutions in the first place, is to foster goodwill
243 STALLMAN, supra note 6, at 46-50.

244Id. at 7-24.
24 5
d. at 12-13.
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and strengthen relationships with developer communities. 24 6 Firms often seek to
be viewed as good actors in the open license movements because their products
and services' commercial viability depend in significant ways on good relations
with developer communities. 2 47
But the FOSS, Creative Commons, and related movements could go further
by eliminating IP rights altogether and thereby removing the conflicts between
the normative visions of such movements and their actual implementation. Put
another way, if a societal consensus develops that software and other types of
content typically should not be subject to IP rights, then, notwithstanding what
the law is, others will be more likely to adhere to this consensus. And, the law is
more likely to change accordingly over time, too, to reflect this consensus.
The current disconnect between the normative vision of FOSS and other
open license movements and the actual implementation has the opposite effect.
Reliance on IP rights to further the goal of free access undermines that goal in
important ways by tacitly arguing that IP rights are necessary to foster
innovation and creativity. That is, in a nutshell, essentially the argument in
favor of reciprocity. By failing to trust in the convincing power of the
movements' normative tenets, therefore, the movements have failed to push
back against IP rights in the software and content worlds as forcefully as they
could. As a result, the FOSS and other open license movements concede a
foundation that inherently conflicts with their vision of innovation and
creativity. And that conflict leads to an unnecessary anti-commons that often
slows innovation and creative activity.
One practical negative result of this tension is increasingly complicated
efforts to push back against the very foundation that the movements have
conceded. For instance, Stallman and the Free Software Foundation extensively
revised the General Public License in 2008 after years of public input.24 8 The
new version was meant to address perceived new threats to the FOSS
movement-primarily the use of digital rights management to thwart free
access to software and increasingly sophisticated patent deals. 249 But the
complexity of the new version has resulted in slower than expected adoption, 2 50
increased transaction costs in dealing with the license's complexities, and some
firms' prohibition of materials licensed under the new version altogether. 25 1 As
246

See BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE, OPEN SOURCE GOVERNANCE IN HIGHLY REGULATED

COMPANIES

5,

available at advance.blackducksoftware.com/content/WPossRegulated

Companies (discussing the "brand" risk firms face when failing to abide by FOSS
requirements and discussing a specific example of Microsoft's failure to adhere to FOSS
license requirements and the resulting damage to Microsoft's relationship with the developer
community).
247 d.
248
See generally Asay, supra note 39.

249I. at 288.
250
See Aslett, Continuing Decline, supra note 158 (discussing the declining percentage
of GPL-licensed projects relative to attribution-only licenses).
251 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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new technological "threats" develop, similarly complicated license revisions
may ensue in order to address them. 252 Rather than promoting innovation and
creativity, however, such efforts often simply introduce significant transaction
costs without appearing to achieve the desired result: greater freedom of use. A
public domain approach would achieve that result.
V. MAKING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN PUBLIC
This Article has thus far offered reasons to doubt that IP rights are the best
method by which to promote open innovation. An IP approach often results in a
tragedy of the anti-commons, while failing to prevent a tragedy of the commons
in a meaningful way. Those that choose open innovation do so for a variety of
extrinsic and intrinsic reasons that generally have little if anything to do with IP
rights, and a public domain approach would arguably do little to undermine
these reasons for participation. A public domain approach, therefore, would
encourage at least similar levels of participation in open innovation movements
and, in fact, would arguably lead to greater participation by eliminating
significant transaction costs. A public domain approach would also eliminate
future transaction costs stemming from rent-seeking by IP trolls, as well as
aligning the normative roots of such movements with their actual mechanics. In
addition to helping reduce wasteful transaction costs, such realignment would
better serve the purpose of pushing back against expansive IP rights in the
software and content worlds.
The question remains, however, how to best promote a public domain
approach. Materials can qualify for the public domain in two general ways. The
first is through private action: right holders or potential right holders may
dedicate the materials to the public domain, despite whatever IP rights they may
have in such materials. 253 Individuals or firms can do so through tools such as
that provided by the Creative Commons 254 or by simply forfeiting patent rights,
for instance, by using an invention publicly and failing to file for patent rights in
the permitted timeframe.
The other method consists in government action-that is, the government
can either exempt certain categories of materials from IP rights or limit the time
period for which IP rights subsist in the materials, after which time period the
materials enter the public domain. The public domain can be expanded,
therefore, by the government expanding the categories of materials that are not
subject to IP rights or limiting the time periods for which IP rights subsist in the
materials. In the United States and elsewhere, however, governments and courts
have recently shrunk the public domain by expanding the categories of
252
253

Indeed, some efforts are already underway to update the latest version of the GPL.
See generally Merges, supra note 182.
254 Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses
and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 396-98 (2010)

(discussing at length the mechanics of the Creative Commons public domain tools).
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materials that are subject to IP rights 255 and increasing the time periods for
which IP rights subsist in such materials. 256
Private action, therefore, appears to be the more likely route towards
expanding the public domain. But using private tools to dedicate materials to
the public domain is fraught with certain complexities, as discussed below.
Government action could help solve some of these complexities by simplifying
the method by which parties contribute materials to the public domain. Indeed,
a Public Domain Act would be a welcome and needed addition to the IP
statutory regime in the United States, 2 57 and in certain respects seems politically
feasible since its focus would be to facilitate individual choice rather than limit
the rights of entrenched interests. The following sections first examine the
current state of private tools used to dedicate materials to the public domain and
some of the issues that arise in that context, followed by an examination of what
a Public Domain Act might look like in order to address such issues.

A. PrivateAction Unadulterated
As discussed above, effectively placing materials in the public domain in
the United States through private action would ideally require relinquishing any
applicable copyright and patent rights (and all related rights). Waiving
trademark rights is inadvisable since doing so may result in significant
consumer confusion. Any trade secret rights would cease to exist as soon as the
materials were made public. 2 58
255 See, e.g., William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the
Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 453, 455 (2012)

(reviewing academic commentary focusing on the expansion of IP rights and the threats that
such expansion poses).
256 See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (extending the term of copyright
protection in the United States).
257 Others have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., The
Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175,

1227-28 (2010) (recommending that Congress amend the Copyright Act to make it easier
for copyright holders to dedicate materials to the public domain).
258 In some jurisdictions other rights may be applicable, and therefore require waiver, in
order for accompanying materials to fully fall in the public domain. For instance, since the
Creative Commons public domain dedication tool is intended to be effective worldwide, the
tool attempts to address different issues that arise depending on the jurisdiction. "Moral
rights" in Europe are inalienable, for instance, and so even if one attempts to dedicate
copyrighted material to the public domain, such an attempt under some European laws may
not effectively disclaim such moral rights. Because of this and other issues in various
jurisdictions regarding the effectiveness of public domain dedications, the Creative
Commons public domain dedication tool includes a backup license meant to replicate the
effect of the public domain dedication. However, the Creative Commons indicates that even
the fallback license approach may fail in some jurisdictions. The scope of this Article limits
itself to U.S. law, while acknowledging that international cooperation on these issues is
critical and therefore worth exploring.
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The options for achieving this result, however, are limited. For instance, the
Creative Commons public domain legal tool-perhaps the best example of a
private tool used to dedicate materials to the public domain-expressly exempts
patent rights from the public domain dedication because of the "complexities
associated with patent rights." 259 Avoiding patent rights in the tool may come
with good reason. For one, the Creative Commons licenses are generally
intended for content that is not normally patentable subject matter. Furthermore,
patent rights are unlike copyrights in at least one important respect: whereas
copyrights obtain automatically so long as some modicum of originality is fixed
in a tangible medium, patent rights must be applied .for and granted through a
long prosecution process. Consequently, questions arise regarding how to
effectively waive rights that one may or may not ever seek or obtain.
Other complexities arise due to the nature of patent rights themselves.
Would the patent waiver only be with respect to the dedicated work or in
general? Would the waiver be structured as a covenant not to sue? If so, what
would the scope of such a covenant be? These additional complexities likely
played a role in steering the Creative Commons away from addressing patent
rights, especially given that most content subject to Creative Commons licenses
would be ineligible for patent protection in any event.
However, while such an exemption may be palatable in the world of
content, in the software world and others patent rights cause significant
transactions costs and thus remain a concern. Waiving them as part of a public
domain dedication is therefore desirable in order to create a commons that is
free of IP entanglements and the resulting transaction costs.
Specific statutory IP doctrines, furthermore, may prevent private public
domain waivers such as the Creative Commons tool from being fully effective.
In the copyright sphere, for instance, U.S. federal law allows copyright holders
and their heirs to terminate any transfer or license of copyright interests during
certain defined periods. 260 This doctrine, by providing copyright holders with a
means of recovery in the event that they entered into an unprofitable bargain
that they later regret, has the perverse effect of possibly preventing effective
public domain dedications. 2 6 1 Some commentators have consequently called for
legislation and other proposals to address this and related issues. 262
Aside from specific patent and copyright obstacles in dedicating materials
to the public domain, significant amounts of conflicting information regarding
what the public domain is, what it entails, and how to dedicate materials to it
259

CCO FAQ, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/CCOFAQ

(last

modified
June 21, 2012).
260

See, e.g., About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013); Various Licenses and Comments About Them, GNU

OPERATING Sys., http://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.html (last updated July 15, 2013);
Open Source Licenses, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/licenses (last visited
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also exist. Perhaps most obviously, both the FOSS and Creative Commons
movements include so many different licenses as to make it difficult to know
what the right path to the public domain is. 263 In fact, often creators mistakenly
believe that open licenses are in essence public domain dedications. 2 64 The
Creative Commons, Free Software Foundation, and Open Source Iniative all
provide significant amounts of commentary explaining the various license
options. 265 But such commentaries, together with complex license texts
themselves, leave much to sift through when the goal may often be quite simple.
Furthermore, such movements' determination to maintain an IP approach,
despite such an approach falling short in achieving its stated purposes, as
discussed above, also serves to obscure the path to the public domain by
convincing creators that TP rights and reciprocity, for instance, are necessary to
maintain the movements.
A Public Domain Act could help address many of these issues by providing
a straightforward means by which to contribute materials to the public domain.
The next section examines how this might work.

B. A PublicDomain Act
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 26 6 The U.S. Constitution, therefore, expressly adopts the principle
that granting authors and inventors IP rights in their works is important to
spurring creative and inventive activity and authorizes Congress to act
accordingly.
But what the open license movements discussed in this Article seem to
confirm is that IP rights are not the only way to incent such activity, and that
inventors and authors also contribute significant inventive and creative activity
for a variety of other reasons, in many cases in spite of IP rights. This is not to
argue that IP rights should be done away, or that they do not in many cases
function as an important incentive to creative and inventive activity. They
clearly do. But it is to say that another path to promoting "the Progress of
Science and useful Arts" lies in unlocking the potential of the public domain.

1. A PublicDomain Symbol
A Public Domain Act could help do so by creating a universal symbol for
when materials are in the public domain. For instance, much like the "(C)"
263

Gomulkiewicz, supra note 183, at 280-82.
264 Practitioners must often disabuse clients of confusion on this topic. For one such
general effort from a practitioner along these lines, see Brad Frazer, Open Source Is Not
Public
Domain: Evolving LicensingPhilosophies,45 IDAHO L. REv. 349, 365-66 (2009).
265
See supra note 260.

266 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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symbol that signifies something is subject to copyright, a "(PD)" symbol could
be adopted to indicate that materials are free of copyright and patent claims, at
least from those dedicating such materials. Rather than having to rely on thirdparty licenses that approximate these intentions, or come up with some public
domain declaration of their own, parties could use such a symbol as a simple
means to achieve public domain status.
A (PD) symbol could also serve the role of providing parties with
attribution. For instance, if a creator or inventor decided toinclude their name
with the (PD) symbol, the Public Domain Act could prohibit subsequent users
from removing the designation. In the FOSS context, this requirement would
not require compiling attribution documents or making public domain source
code available to additional downstream users. It would simply mean that users
of public domain materials should leave the "(PD) 2012 John Doe" designation
intact. The Public Domain Act might provide for some limited statutory
damages to help ensure that users take this requirement seriously.
In order to deter parties from wrongfully placing materials in the public
domain through use of the (PD) symbol, the Public Domain Act might also
make available statutory damages against those who place materials in the
public domain with actual knowledge or reason to know that they do not have
the rights to do so. Such a provision would be an important safeguard against
the Public Domain Act being exploited and the (PD) symbol thereby losing
credibility. Relatedly, the Act might provide some sort of infringement safe
harbor for users of public domain-designated materials that rely on the
designation in good faith.

2. A Limited Patent Waiver
Ideally a Public Domain Act would by default limit the patent rights being
waived to the specific materials containing the (PD) designation. This seems
logical from the perspective of both the dedicator and subsequent user. The
contributor would likely only wish to dedicate the materials to which she
attaches the (PD) designation, and so would not expect the dedication to extend
to other materials that she has not similarly dedicated. This default limitation
would thus better encourage contributions to the public domain. The subsequent
user would similarly gain a windfall if the patent rights waived extended
beyond the actual materials she was receiving. Of course, if patent holders
wished to dedicate a patent in its entirety to the public domain, then the Public
Domain Act would ideally provide for a means to do that as well. Crafting the
exact language is beyond the scope of this Article, but the general concept of a
limited patent waiver would be an important part of a Public Domain Act.
Ideally the patent waiver would also function as a bar to obtaining patent
rights related to the dedicated materials. That is, if a dedicator does not already
have patents reading on the dedicated materials, the dedication would mean that
the materials are now prior art that should prevent both the dedicator and any
other party from obtaining a patent that reads on the materials. Ideally, then, no
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grace period under patent law would be applicable for applying for patent rights
once the materials were released into the public domain under the (PD)
designation.
If the dedicator already does have patents that read on the dedicated
materials (or has filed for a patent that is ultimately issued), the patent waiver
should be more than simply a covenant not to sue from the original dedicator.
Courts have at times found that covenants not to sue do not automatically bind
future patent owners.2 67 So, for instance, if a third party dedicated some
materials to the public domain but owned patents reading on such materials, and
the Public Domain Act failed to make clear that any subsequent owner of the
relevant patents was also bound by the dedication with respect to those
materials, the new owner might reasonably expect to be able to bring a patent
action against users of the dedicated materials. The Public Domain Act would
therefore need to clearly address this issue in favor of the public domaindedicated materials and users thereof as well as potential issues relating to
patent exhaustion, where similar issues might arise. 268
One potential drawback to the public domain approach compared to the
open license IP approach is that many FOSS licenses also include patent
licenses from subsequent users. So, theoretically at least, patent protection is
broader in the open license context because subsequent distributors of openlicensed materials also grant patent rights to additional downstream users. In the
public domain approach, conversely, the patent protection comes only from the
person or entity that dedicates the materials to the public domain, as well as
those that might obtain that original dedicator's relevant patents. A subsequent
user of such public domain materials with a patent that reads on them could take
and use the materials, distribute them to third parties, and then require those
third parties to take a patent license or face a patent infringement suit.
There are reasons to doubt that patent protection in the open license context
is in reality any broader than it would be under a public domain approach,
however. As discussed above, firms go to significant lengths to ensure that their
patent and other economic interests are not compromised through use of openlicensed materials. Consequently, while in the open license context there may
be an appearance of significant patent protection from firms because of the
presence of patent licenses in the open licenses, in reality the actual patent
protection from firms is likely much narrower than imagined (i.e., due to the
extensive measures that firms take to protect their patent interests). It seems
likely, then, that firms would continue to address patent issues in the public
domain world much the same way they do currently in the FOSS world:
carefully.
267
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Furthermore, as also discussed above, many of those that participate in open
license projects don't pursue patents on the technologies that they contribute,
and so don't have patent rights to grant to subsequent users in any event. Or if
they do own patents, they already have significant incentives not to assert them
against the broader community, since they rely on the goodwill of that
community to support their business models.
Another potential drawback of a public domain approach to patents is that it
may mean that the public domain world would be disadvantaged vis-i-vis the
"proprietary" world in terms of patents. That is, those that adopt the public
domain approach may be left defenseless against those that choose to pursue
patents. 269 But this potential drawback proves unconvincing. First, as discussed
above, few FOSS projects currently pursue patents as it is. Second, for those
concerned about being defenseless, they could either obtain or file for patents
before dedicating materials to the public domain or simply not dedicate them at
all.
Ideally the Public Domain Act would also address the issue of termination
of transfers in copyright law. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the
best method by which to do this; others have devoted scholarship to this issue.
But a Public Domain Act could provide a useful vehicle for finally addressing
it.

3. The PublicDomain Act in Practice
How would the Public Domain Act work in practice? In the FOSS context,
for instance, would developers actually contribute materials to projects under
the public domain without some sort of assurance that the project would
actually make the project itself public domain? This issue would likely be
addressed through the contributor agreements rather than as part of a Public
Domain Act. For instance, contributors might provide materials to a project
under a public domain designation so long as the project agrees to make the
whole project available under a public domain designation as well. Most FOSS
projects already operate in a similar manner; the agreement simply indicates
that the contribution will be used under whatever FOSS license the relevant
project has chosen. 270
Would creators actually rely on the Public Domain Act and use the (PD)
designation? Those that believe in reciprocity may decline and continue to use
269 Because of this concern, some have advocated adopting a more comprehensive
approach to addressing patent issues in the open license communities than is currently
pursued. See generally Schultz & Urban, supra note 20, at 6-13.
2 70
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org/psf/contrib/contrib-form/contributor-agreement.pdf. In some cases the projects retain
somewhat more wiggle room. For instance, the Apache Software Foundation indicates
simply that contributions will always be used for the "public benefit." The Apache Software
Found., Individual ContributorLicense Agreement Version 2.0, APACHE, available at http://

www.apache.org/licenses/icla.txt (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).

2013]

CASE FOR THE PUBLICDOMAIN

805

reciprocal licenses for their projects. Others might continue to use IP-based
open licenses simply out of inertia or because of greater familiarity with them.
But the Public Domain Act would provide another, simpler option for making
materials available for public consumption. And such an option, as this Article
has argued, presents significant advantages over the IP-based approach in many
contexts.

VI. CONCLUSION
Open license movements came at just the right time. In the face of
increasingly aggressive corporate assertions of IP rights, the FOSS and Creative
Commons movements provided powerful checks to those assertions. They gave
a voice and means to many who wished for a world of creativity and innovation
freer than that envisioned in corporate boardrooms. Their vision, and the legal
tools architected to help achieve that vision, have succeeded in helping recast
dialogues in both the content and software worlds.
But at what cost? The legal tools selected, while understandable in context,
suffer from a flaw: they rely on the same foundation that they seek to do away
with. This IP "schizophrenia" has had significant repercussions, as this Article
has detailed. Most immediately, it leads to wasteful transaction costs that inhibit
innovation and creative activity in many cases. More futuristically, it paves the
way for significant IP troll activity, especially in the copyright realm. And
generally, it concedes and even implicitly argues in favor of the legitimacy and
necessity of lP rights in the software and content worlds.
What is more, the costs of the TP approach do not appear necessary in light
of actual experience or based on the reasons that most choose to participate in
open innovation movements. The anti-commons that the IP approach helps
create is typically not needed to fend off a tragedy of the commons. By and
large contributors to the commons have come to believe in and understand the
virtues of the commons, and so already have incentives to contribute to it. This
may not have been true at the inception of such open license movements, but it
seems clear now. Furthermore, the anti-commons arises precisely as a result of
firms taking precautions to avoid the effects of licensing requirements they
deem to be against their interests. The anti-commons, therefore, does not ensure
the existence of the commons-in many cases it simply makes it less useful.
A public domain approach would eliminate many of the wasteful costs, both
now and in the future, while still satisfying the goals of most of those interested
in contributing to such a commons. A Public Domain Act, furthermore, would
be a welcome and needed addition to the U.S. IP statutory regime, providing yet
another important path towards "promoting the sciences and useful arts."
This Article does not argue, however, that IP rights are unnecessary or
trivial in encouraging creativity or innovation. Too much evidence suggests
they are important to encouraging creative and inventive activity in many
important areas. But IP rights are only one option for spurring such activity. The
open license movements discussed in this Article provide powerful examples of
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how innovation and creativity are often encouraged in spite of IP rights, not
because of them. The best way to achieve such movements' full potential,
therefore, is not through an IP licensing approach, but through a full-throated
public domain route. Open innovation movements may wish to rely on IP rights
in their transition to true openness and freedom. But if such reliance becomes
permanent, open innovation movements give up their birthright. It need not be
so.

